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THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES
LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR.*
When a church breaks into factions or a local church withdraws
from a denomination, the disputants also frequently divide over who
should retain the church property.I If the parties seek judicial redress,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School-Camden. B.A., Yale Univer-
sity, 1967; J.D., University of Texas, 1972. I thank my colleagues Jay M. Feinman and Steven F.
Friedell for their kind assistance. I also thank my research assistants, Judith Drasin, Cheryl Gray,
Jeffrey Kale, and Barbara Massa.
1. Internal disputes over church property continue to generate noteworthy litigation and
frequently involve sizeable stakes. For example, after the most recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), the Alabama Supreme Court awarded the two
million dollar assets of the Trinity Presbyterian Church to the majority of the congregation who
left the Presbyterian Church in the United States to join the Presbyterian Church in America, a
more conservative denomination. Trinity Presbyterian Church v. Tankersley, 374 So. 2d 861 (Ala.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980). See Maust, Connectional Denominations Try Relying Their
Properly Slipknots, 23 CHRISTIANITY TODAY 1271 (1979). The New Jersey Supreme Court has
recently decided two cases, together concerning over one-half million dollars in property and cash.
Diocese of Newark v. Burns, 83 N.J. 594, 417 A.2d 31 (1980); Protestant Episcopal Church v.
Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19 (1980). In June 1980, the General Assembly of the United
Presbyterian Church amended its constitution to assert that local church property was in a denom-
inational trust for the two and one-half million member church. The amendment attempts to
insure that a schismatic local church cannot take local property with it. See United Presbyterians
.4ct to Tighten Church Control, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1980, at A14, col. 6. See also Maust, Rumbles
of Realignment in US. Presbyterianism, 24 CHRJSTIANrrY TODAY 520 (1980).
A related topic beyond this Article's scope is the constitutionality of state intervention to pre-
vent violation of laws relating to charitable trusts. The most recent newsworthy illustration was
the attempt by the California Attorney General to place into receivership the assets of the World-
wide Church of God in order to prevent an alleged diversion of assets to the personal benefit of
those controlling the church. Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.
1980). On four occasions, the church's leaders unsuccessfully sought certiorari to halt trial court
orders stemming from the litigation. Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 101 S. Ct. 270
(1980); Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. Superior Court of Cal., 100 S. Ct. 2974 (1980); Rader v.
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the reviewing civil court may discover that the issue does not lend itself
to easy resolution, because the dispute may result from disagreement
over ecclesiastical governance or doctrine. The first amendment's reli-
gion clauses, however, compel the court to devise a method of resolu-
tion that does not address the merits of the religious controversy or
related church issues.2 By declaring the central matter to fall beyond
judicial purview, the Constitution requires a court to resolve a dispute
often without access to critical information. 3
Church property disputes furnish a case study on the intersection of
public law and private law. The private association makes internal al-
locations of property interests, and principles of private law normally
decide any disputes that may arise.4 Public concerns, here the concern
for religious autonomy, may require modifying the private law. Modi-
Superior Court of Cal., 444 U.S. 916 (1979); Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 444 U.S. 883 (1979) (certiorari petitions in response to unreported decisions by California
court of appeals). The Attorney General finally dropped the action when the legislature enacted
a law that would prospectively forbid his office from initiating such litigation. See California Plan-
ning to Halt Cases on Church of God and Synanon, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1980, at A28, col. 4. The
Attorney General had also initiated litigation of a similar nature against Synanon, which claimed
it was a church. See Synanon Foundation, Inc. v. California, 444 U.S. 1307 (1979) (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
first applied the free exercise clause to the states, and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947),
first applied the establishment clause to the states. For a history of the process of incorporation of
the clauses into the fourteenth amendment, see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
253-65 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). The constitutional guarantees were first applied to cases
concerning internal church disputes in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memo-
rial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190
(1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
3. Extensive academic studies of the topic are not current. The best pieces include Casad,
Church Property Litigation. A Comment on the Hull Church Case, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 44
(1970); Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969
Sup. CT. REv. 347; Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1142 (1962); Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Consti-
tutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113 (1965). A recent discussion is Adams & Hanlon, Jones
v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses o/the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
1291 (1980). Also of value are L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12 (1978); An-
not., 52 A.L.R.3d 324 (1973). The church history that deals most thoroughly with the issues covers
only the early cases. C. ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 142-235 (1917). A later edi-
tion appeared in 1933, but the earlier version is the classic edition.
4. See Chafee, The Internal Affairs ofAssociations Not/or Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993
(1930); Sampen, Civil Courts, Church Property, andNeutral Princ~ies: A Dissenting View, 1975 U.
ILL. L.F. 543, 558-70; Developments in the Law-Judicial Control ofPrivate Associations, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 983 (1963).
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fled rules of private law, however, may produce decisions that fre-
quently fail to do justice. In this instance, the first amendment directs
courts to steer clear of the underlying religious controversy; therefore,
they may not consider evidence of the sort they might examine in a
nonecclesiastical dispute. Consequently, rules of private law are modi-
fied to exclude the forbidden evidence. The result is a new method-
ology for dispute resolution for which the excluded evidence is
nonessential. If, as this Article concludes, the modifications fail, the
judiciary should make other modifications to develop a more satisfac-
tory methodology. The alternative is to continue with current methods
but to acknowledge that the decisions they produce are pragmatic ways
to settle controversies rather than ways to approximate perfect justice.
The underlying constitutional concerns are appropriate. The rele-
vant Supreme Court cases explicitly invoke the first amendment's free
exercise clause,5 but they consistently emphasize the dangers of church-
state entanglement,6 an argument associated with the establishment
clause.7 The focus of concern is not the individual believer, but the
religious organization.' The cases assume that this institutional protec-
tion safeguards the free exercise rights of church members who exercise
their rights as voluntary adherents of the organization. 9 The constitu-
5. Eg., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440,448-50 (1969); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08, 120-21 (1952).
6. Eg., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 709-10 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1969); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 119
(1952).
7. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 865-66.
8. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 7 10-11, 721-22 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Pres-
byterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 876.
9. See, eg., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606-07, 618-19 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); L.
TIaBE, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 876. Religious voluntarism and its corollary, political noninvolve-
ment, also underlie the establishment clause. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development: Part I1 The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 517
(1968). The first amendment also aligns itself with pluralist political theory--that private associa-
tions should enjoy maximum freedom from the state if they are to contribute most to society's
well-being. See Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 986-90, (citing J. FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN
THE MODERN STATE 18-22, 32-39 (2d ed. 1914); Laski, Notes on the Strict Interpretation of Ecclesi-
astical Trusts, 36 CAN. L.T. 190 (1916); Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARv. L. REv.
404, 418-29 (1916)). For a critical viewpoint, see Stringfellow, Law, Polity, and the Reunion of the
ChurcA" The Emerging Conflict Between Law and Theology in America, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 412, 412-
19 (1959) (arguing that church-state separation reflects the theology of Protestant dissent, favors
religious pluralism, and thus is not a neutral policy).
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tional analysis thus recognizes the intimate relationship between the
first amendment's religion clauses; the avoidance of entanglement pro-
tects the church's free exercise rights and implicitly the members'
rights.
Since 1872,10 the Supreme Court has furnished guidance with a se-
ries of decisions, but it still has failed to fully solve the problem of
methodology. This Article first argues that the Court has accepted
some methods and rejected others without establishing a defensible
theoretical basis for the distinctions. The Article therefore reevaluates
the case law and the methods it has produced for resolving church
property disputes.
The Supreme Court has approved two methods for resolving church
property disputes. One method is that of complete deference to church
authority. Complete deference, first approved in Watson v. Jones,"
calls for a court to defer to the judgment of the highest authority in a
hierarchical church and to the majority, or other designated deci-
sionmaker, in a congregational church. The other method, approved in
Jones v. Wolf,12 is based on the concept of neutral principles. The
method has two versions. Under the "formal title" version, a court
may look to statutes, deeds, and other secular documents-that is, arti-
cles of incorporation and the like, as opposed to internal church docu-
ments, such as constitutions and books of discipline-to determine
property ownership.13 Under the broader version of neutral principles,
courts may also consider provisions in church documents. 14 Under
neither version does neutral principles permit inquiry into religious
doctrine.' 5 Thus, a court may not rely on a provision that requires an
interpretation of religious doctrine or governance; it must rely entirely
on "secular" language--that is, language that a civil court can interpret
without the need to interpret church doctrine or governance.16 The
10. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
11. Id.
12. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
13. Eg., Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167
S.E.2d 658 (1969); Merryman v. Price, 147 Ind. App. 295, 259 N.E.2d 883 (1970), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 852 (1971).
14. E.g., Paradise Hills Church, Inc. v. International Church of Foursquare Gospel, 467 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Ariz. 1979); Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976).
15. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979).
16. In the context of these cases, "secular" has a broad meaning. Just as "secular language"
does not require courts to interpret church doctrine or governance, "secular provisions" in docu-
[Vol. 59:1
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rule of complete deference, then, seeks to avoid constitutional difficul-
ties by relying entirely on internal church decisions. Neutral principles
seeks the same goal by looking exclusively to secular language and
traditional concepts of property law.
In developing these methods, the Court has emphasized that safe-
guarding church rights requires keeping churches independent of secu-
lar control or manipulation. 7 A church's right to choose its doctrines
and polity (form of government)' 8 requires that the state not intrude for
the benefit of one faction over another. 9 The dangers to religious free-
dom, however, have more subtle dimensions. If, for example, a judicial
decision resolves a dispute on a doctrinal basis, it rewards the faction
adhering to the court's interpretation and deters churches from deviat-
ing from that interpretation lest they forfeit the chance for judicial sup-
port.2 ° State entanglement in religious controversy thus can inhibit the
free development of doctrine.2' Such judicial intrusion also risks impli-
cating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. The
state's limited competence in adjudicating doctrinal disputes creates the
danger of misinterpretation and may result in the state creating its own
ments are provisions that do not require the interpretation of religious concepts. This Article also
refers to "secular documents" as documents, such as deeds and articles of incorporation, that a
church or other organization would limit not to internal use, but would normally file on public
record to meet civil responsibilities.
17. Eg., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 721-22 (1976) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
18. In church affairs, "polity" is frequently used to describe "the general governmental struc-
ture of a church and the organs of authority defined by its own organic law." Kauper, supra note
3, at 353-54.
19. E.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 709 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952).
20. The classic illustration of state interference with doctrinal change is Free Church of Scot-
land v. Overtoun, [1904] A.C. 515 (Scot.), in which a small group of congregations successfully
argued that they were entitled to the extensive property holdings of the United Free Church of
Scotland, because the denomination had departed from past doctrine--the principle of an estab-
lished church-when it merged with the United Presbyterian Church. At stake were three univer-
sities, 800 churches, and over one million pounds in investments. Parliament, however, reversed
the decision and established a commission to fairly reallocate the property. Churches (Scotland)
Act, 1905, 5 Edw. 7, c. 12. For an account, see Peck, American Versus British Ecclesiastical Law,
15 YALE .J. 255, 255-59 (1906). The Supreme Court has recognized the danger ofjudicial favor-
itism toward a church faction because of its doctrinal beliefs. E.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952).
21. See, eg., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696,710 (1976) (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969)).
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standard as a replacement for the authentic religious one." Judicial
intrusion thus can subvert the religious association.
The church property cases also exhibit considerable awareness that
even minor intrusion must be prohibited, because even an intrusion
that is not obviously detrimental threatens damage to religious free-
dom. The hazards of entanglement23 justify a healthy margin for error
in judicial decisions to avoid unconstitutional inquiry. For example, a
court may not inquire into the precise jurisdiction of a hierarchical tri-
bunal24 or its fidelity to church procedural rules,25 because the inquiry
may lead to doctrinal misinterpretation. If the Court were to view the
constitutional analysis as balancing the risk of abridging religious free-
dom against the risk of permitting a church to act unfairly against the
members' expectations, the scale weighted with the former concern
would virtually always outweigh the latter scale.26 Under current case
law, the only possible exception might arise in the rare instance of secu-
larly defined fraud or collusion by church decisionmakers.27 Even in
this case, however, the result of the balance is uncertain.
Heightened sensitivity to the hazards of entanglement has led the
Court to insist that its determinations are entirely divorced from any
22. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 450-51 (1969).
23. First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is
made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and
practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the
property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of reli-
gious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical con-
e.. . . [Tihe [First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church
property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449 (1969). See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 709-10, 713-14 (1976).
24. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
710 (1976) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872)).
25. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
713 (1976).
26. In another first amendment context, the Court stated that state infringement on free reli-
gious exercise could be compelled by only "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests
. .. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945)).
27. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
713 n.7 (1976), outlawed judicial inquiry into arbitrariness by church decisionmakers in a hierar-
chical church, but did not decide whether a court could review allegations of fraud or collusion.
The Court has yet to reach the issue. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 n.8 (1979). See also
notes 187-205 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:1
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related controversy over religious doctrine and that the tools for deci-
sionmaking are entirely secular and religiously neutral."8 This Article,
however, argues that assertions of judicial neutrality for methods cur-
rently in use rest on questionable assumptions that permit courts to
avoid the religious implications of their methodologies and to claim
accuracy in the resulting decisions.
The Article begins with a sympathetic analysis of the Supreme Court
cases. It explains how the Court has dealt with the underlying
problems of church-state relationships. According to the argument, the
Court has viewed intrachurch affairs in ways that permit it to designate
certain judicial solutions as constitutional. The assumption that church
members fully submit to designated church authority justifies the com-
plete deference method, and the assumption that provisions in various
documents reflect an agreement about property ownership justifies neu-
tral principles. The Article then critically assesses the complete defer-
ence and neutral principles tests, which have resulted from case law
development. It questions not only the assumptions underlying their
use, but also the ability of the tests to avoid intrusion into matters pro-
tected by the first amendment. Finally, the Article proposes the secular
documents method as an alternative means for deciding these disputes.
I. THE SUPREME COURT CASES: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF METHODOLOGY
A. Watson v. Jones
Watson v. Jones29 begins the line of Supreme Court cases dealing
with church property disputes. The Court declared that the civil judici-
ary should not evaluate underlying doctrinal controversy, but instead
should completely defer to the determinations of internal church au-
thority.30
28. See, eg., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Maryland & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
29. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). For detailed recountings of the case, see, e.g., M. HowE,
THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESs 74-88 (1965); Weeks & Hickey, "Implied Trust"for Connec-
tional Churches: Watson v. Jones Revisited, 54 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 459 (1976); Note, Judicial
Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 3, at 1154-58.
30. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. Prior to Watson, New England judges tended to side with local
dissenting congregations, and elsewhere the denomination and its loyalists frequently proved vic-
torious. For a brief history, see Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church
Properly, supra note 3, at 1149-54.
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The Civil War divided the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in
Louisville, Kentucky, although the denomination's General Assem-
bly3 sided with the Union. A majority of the congregation agreed with
the General Assembly, but a pro-Southern faction dominated the local
session.32 The dispute continued into the post-war years, and the ap-
pointment of the pastor and the installation of new session members
were the resulting controversies that involved both church and civil au-
thorities.33 The General Assembly and the state synod declared the
loyal faction to be the true church, but the Kentucky courts held for the
dissidents.34 The loyalist faction then invoked diversity jurisdiction to
bring the case to federal court and won consistent victories before the
circuit court and Supreme Court.35
The Supreme Court employed the case to establish an enduring doc-
trine for resolving church disputes. It divided the types of cases a court
might encounter into three categories. First, the Court recognized that
property might be subject to an express trust "devoted to the teaching,
support or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or be-
lief."3 6 In these cases, according to the Court, the general law of secu-
lar charities should apply, and the Court should enforce the trust. If
necessary, the judiciary must engage in doctrinal inquiry to determine
the beneficiary's fidelity to the trust's objective. 37
The second class of cases deals with the congregational or independ-
ent church that, "so far as church government is concerned, owes no
fealty or obligation to any higher authority."3 " For these churches, the
31. The Presbyterian polity is hierarchical and of the synodical or associational variety. The
local congregation chooses members to comprise a session to see to daily administrative affairs.
All the ministers and an elder from each church comprise the presbytery for the district and super-
vise the spiritual welfare of member churches. The synod consists of all the ministers and an elder
from each church in a district composed of several presbyteries. At the highest level is the General
Assembly, consisting of selected ministers and elders from the presbyteries. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
681-82.
32. A session is the governing body of the local church. Id
33. The full history of the controversy is complicated. For elaborate capitulations, see id. at
681-700 (1872) (statement of the case); Weeks & Hickey, supra note 29, at 459-66.
34. Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332 (1867). The court recognized a general principle of
judicial deference to church authorities, but asserted the power to review the jurisdiction asserted
by those authorities. Id at 347-48. It held that under the denomination's constitution, the synod
lacked authority over local church elections. Id at 353-54.
35. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
36. Id at 722.
37. Id at 723-24.
38. Id at 722.
[Vol. 59:1
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standard rules for secular voluntary associations also apply, and deci-
sional authority rests with the majority of members or any organ for
governance that they have instituted.39 The organ might consist of
trustees or other church officers.
The final class of cases, which includes the dispute in Watson v.
Jones, involves hierarchical churches. In these cases, the congregation
or church body holding the property "is but a subordinate member of
some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesias-
tical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or
less complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership
of that general organization." 4 In these cases, courts must defer to the
general church's highest authority. 41
In adopting a deferential rule, the Court specifically rejected the
English departure-from-doctrine rule. Under that rule, a court would
view church property as an implied trust held for the benefit of those
who keep the true doctrine of the church, that is, the doctrine to which
the church's founders subscribed. In case of dispute, a court would as-
certain the church's true doctrine and find for the faction that adhered
to it.42 The Watson Court noted that the English standard developed
to resolve disputes concerning dissenting churches in a country with an
established church. The Court therefore attributed the English judici-
ary's intrusiveness to a constrained conception of free religious exer-
cise.43 According to the Court, religious freedom in the United States
39. Id at 724-26.
40. Id at 722-23.
41. [Wlhenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter
has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding
on them, in their application to the case before them.
Id at 727. The Court gave a broad definition of ecclesiastical matters: "[T]heological contro-
versy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the
church to the standard of morals required of them." Id at 733.
42. Lord Eldon first articulated the English rule in Attorney General ex rel Mander v. Pear-
son, 3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1817). He formulated much of his thinking on the rule in
Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813). For a discussion of the cases, see
Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 3, at 1145-49.
43. And we can very well understand how the Lord Chancellor of England, who is, in
his office, in a large sense, the head and representative of the Established Church, who
controls very largely the church patronage, and whose judicial decision may be, and not
unfrequently is, invoked in cases of heresy and ecclesiastical contumacy, should feel,
even in dealing with a dissenting church, but little delicacy in grappling with the most
abstruse problems of theological controversy, or in construing the instruments which
those churches have adopted as their rules of government, or inquiring into their customs
and usages .... Laws then existed upon the statute-book hampering the free exercise of
Number 1]
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permits religious organizations to create organs to resolve church dis-
putes; the civil judiciary will not reverse their decisions.'
In Watson v. Jones the Supreme Court championed the autonomy of
the religious organization, but emphasized the institution rather than
the individual member. It grounded its argument on the right of indi-
viduals to form associations and create tribunals to resolve disputes;
thus church members impliedly consent to church government. 45 Ac-
cording to the Court, then, a church is a voluntary association, and the
laws governing such associations apply to both the organization and its
members.4' The extreme deference that the Court gave to churches,
however, has deeper roots. The tenor of the opinion discloses a special
concern for the viability of the institutional church. According to the
Court, the availability of recourse to civil courts "would lead to the
total subversion of such religious bodies."'
religious belief and worship in many most oppressive forms, and... there did not exist
that full, entire, and practical freedom for all forms of religious belief and practice which
lies at the foundation of our political principles.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727-28.
44. Id at 728-29.
45. Id at 729.
46. Id at 714. Watson analogized religious organizations to voluntary charitable organiza-
tions and even stated that the "rights of property, or of contract [of religious organizations], are
equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints."
Id The Court, however, did not resolve the dispute precisely according to this analysis. Instead,
it gave the decisions of religious organizations a deference that the decisions of other voluntary
charitable organizations have never enjoyed. See Sampen, supra note 4, at 558, 563-70; Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1036-37.
47. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729. The Court's recognition of the church as an entity, as opposed
to a collection of individual members, permitted it to avoid considering the possibility of partition
among the vying factions. A few older cases permitted partition. E.g., Niccolls v. Rugg, 47 Ill. 47,
51-52 (1868) (ratio of factions' memberships was two to one); Ferraria v. Vasconcellos, 31 Ill. 25,
34, 53 (1863) (two factions nearly equal in number, and the court believed all members had an
equal interest in the property). Many older cases, however, refused to permit partitioning. Eg.,
Dressen v. Brahmeier, 56 Iowa 756, 9 N.W. 193, 197 (1881) (church title was vested in a corpora-
tion; therefore majority should keep property); LeBlanc v. Lemaire, 105 La. 539, 542, 30 So. 135,
137 (1901) (individuals do not have a protectible interest in church property).
Sharing church property as an alternative to partition is even more rare. E.g., Hufihines v.
Sheriff, 65 Okla. 90, 92, 162 P. 491, 493 (1916) (partition was an unnecessary extreme). A Ken-
tucky statute specifically dictates alternate use when a church divides, except when the issue is
excommunication on the grounds of immorality. KY. REv. STAT. § 273.120 (1973). Earlier Ken-
tucky cases often used the statutory device. E.g., Rose v. Briggs, 205 Ky. 619, 266 S.W. 236 (1924)
(statute applies when power of church authority is not backed by a constitution and therefore is
only advisory in nature); Poynter v. Phelps, 129 Ky. 381, 111 S.W. 699 (1908) (both factions re-
tained their beliefs and neither was excommunicated for immorality).
More recent Kentucky cases have avoided alternate use. Two cases have held that in a congre-
gational church, the majority faction should gain complete control, provided it has not departed
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Watson, a pre-Erie decision,48 elucidated only federal common
law. 49 Nonetheless, the Court's concern for church autonomy stemmed
in part from the policies reflected in the first amendment. As a later
Supreme Court opinion noted, the decision "radiates .. .a spirit of
freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular con-
trol or manipulation ... ."1o The way to secure free exercise was to
minimize state interference and to recognize the autonomy of the insti-
tutional church. The extensive deference that resulted implied that in-
stitutional stability was a prerequisite for religious freedom.
The Court enhanced church autonomy by limiting the necessity and
propriety of incursions into both doctrine and polity. Rejecting the
English departure-from-doctrine rule avoided the need not only to con-
strue religious doctrine, but also to determine which deviations are rad-
ical departures from fundamental doctrine as well as which doctrines
are sufficiently fundamental to invoke the rule.5' By rejecting fictional
from church doctrine; otherwise the minority faction should prevail. Fleming v. Rife, 328 S.W.2d
151 (Ky. 1959); Bunnell v. Creacy, 266 S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1954). Dicta in other cases would permit
alternate use temporarily to permit the church to decide which faction should obtain the property.
Bray v. Moses, 305 Ky. 24,28,202 S.W.2d 749,751 (1947); Jones v. Johnson, 295 Ky. 707, 710, 175
S.W.2d 370, 371 (1943).
48. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
49. After Watson, state courts generally followed the decision in cases concerning hierarchi-
cal churches. As for congregational churches, most courts adhered to the English rule's notions of
implied trust and departure-from-doctrine. See C. ZOLLMAN, supra note 3, at 215-21; Casad,
supra note 3, at 51-56; Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICH.
L. REv. 419, 442-47 (1964); Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property,
supra note 3, at 1157-58, 1167-75.
According to one analysis, in most cases in which courts found against a congregational major-
ity, the majority had engaged in an attempt to seriously alter the church's connection with other
churches in a larger organization. Thus, under the guise of protecting doctrinal stability, courts
would protect denominational stability and prevent institutional change. See Casad, The Estab-
lishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, supra, at 444 & nn.82 & 83.
Courts have distinguished, misread, or rejected the Watson precedent. E.g., Smith v. Pedigo,
145 Ind. 361, 393, 44 N.E. 363, 364 (1896) (distinguishing Watson because it dealt with differences
in political belief, not doctrine); Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa 138, 147, 49 N.W.
81, 86 (1891) (Watson is authority for rule that church property is held in trust for church's pur-
poses and any members less than the whole cannot divert it from the church by substantial depar-
ture-from-doctrine); Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353, 384 (1873) (rejecting Watson as nonbinding
authority; courts must decide questions of ecclesiastical law connected with property rights by
virtue of their jurisdiction over property rights).
50. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
51. Evaluating the seriousness of a doctrinal deviation is not always an easy task for the
nonmember of a church. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hinkle, 67 Cal. App. 3d 506, 136 Cal. Rptr. 731, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 858 (1977) (minister of a Unity church who practices charismatically); St.
Nicholas Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church v. Bilanski, 19 Del. Ch. 49, 162 A. 60 (1932) (priest
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implicit trusts and permitting doctrinal inquiry only in cases of explicit
trusts, the Court drastically reduced the instances in which a court
might need to scrutinize the doctrinal beliefs of the church founders.
The narrowed applicability of the trust notion also lessened the impedi-
ment to doctrinal development. A church could modify its religious
tenets without fear that departure from the founders' beliefs would
work a forfeiture. Doctrinal development thus became a permissible
characteristic of a church, subject to the church's internal judgment,
and the civil judiciary therefore could avoid questions of doctrinal
fidelity and change.
By defining the church's internal decisional mechanism as the final
authority, the Watson Court also limited inquiries into ecclesiastical
polity. Under the Watson method, a court need only ascertain whether
the church is hierarchical or congregational and then identify the high-
est church authority, be it the majority of a congregation or a church
tribunal. The Court apparently did not believe that the task called for
answers to essentially religious questions and therefore regarded the
inquiry as a proper activity for the civil judiciary. The Court assumed
that church members submit to a structure of church governance in
which the highest church authority enjoys plenary power and that each
church is either hierarchical or congregational. 52 These assumptions
who changed one word in the mass); Kelley v. Riverside Boulevard Independent Church of God,
44 Ill. App. 3d 673, 358 N.E.2d 696 (1976) (pastor's practice of wearing earrings); Parker v.
Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943) (use of piano music or Sunday school literature);
Mertz v. Schaeffer, 271 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. App. 1954) (whether the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran
Church deviated from Lutheran orthodoxy in its definition of "inspiration" and "church fellow-
ship"); Canterbury v. Canterbury, 143 W. Va. 165, 100 S.E.2d 565 (1957) (whether it violates the
authorized doctrine of the Indian Creek Primitive Baptist Church to state "that the birth of the
spirit is not necessary except to see the church here in time; that there is no hell beyond this life,
and that goats are sheep in disobedience").
Even Lord Eldon, the formulator of the English rule, faced the problem of discerning doctrine.
In Craigdallie v. Aikman, 2 Bligh 529, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (H.L. 1820) (Scot.), the Court of Sessions,
faced with an inability to distinguish the doctrinal principles of the two factions, decided against
the minority faction on the grounds that it had withdrawn from the congregation by refusing
allegiance to the general church. Lord Eldon affirmed the holding:
I have had the mortification, I know not how many times over, to endeavor myself to
understand what these [doctrinal] principles were, and whether they have, or have not,
deviated from them; and I have made the attempt to understand it, till I find it, at least,
on my part to be quite hopeless .... [Aifter racking my mind again and again upon the
subject, I really do not know what more to make of it.
Id at 543-44, 4 Eng. Rep. at 440-41. The Watson Court noted Lord Eldon's plight in its rejection
of the English rule. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727-28.
52. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722, 724-25, 726-27. The Court's analysis did not require it to
distinguish between the two types of hierarchial structure. In the episcopal type, the system is
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made the inquiry seem less intrusive. By making these assumptions,
however, the Court ignored the possibility that a church might contain
elements of both structures and assign some powers exclusively to the
local church and some to the denomination.
The Court further insulated the church from judicial intrusion by
recognizing that a church's decisionmaking system is part of a separate,
independent legal system. Because laws, disciplinary rules, precedents,
and reliance on usage and custom create a self-enclosed system, ques-
tions of church polity do not stand in isolation; they inevitably entangle
a court in matters beyond its competence. Thus the Court forbade ju-
dicial inquiry into the scope of a church tribunal's jurisdiction over ec-
clesiastical subject matter. 3 According to the Court, in almost every
case the criteria for ascertaining jurisdiction-and hence the validity of
the ecclesiastical decree-would be church doctrine. Thus a jurisdic-
tional inquiry would risk the same evils that the Court sought to banish
when it rejected the departure-from-doctrine test. 4 The Court also
seemed to increase a church's judicial immunity by ignoring another
issue. Although complete deference appears to permit church tribunals
to make bad faith decisions with impunity, the Court failed to address
the problem. Apparently the Court's belief in judicial restraint and
church autonomy outweighed concerns about unpalatable church deci-
sions and their adverse impact on religious freedom.
As an additional reason for deferring to church authority, the Court
authoritarian, and ecclesiastical authorities at the top of the structure exercise authority. In the
synodical or associational polity, members at the local level elect representatives to a higher gov-
erning body, and these representatives elect members of a still higher governing body. The Pres-
byterian Church is an example of the latter type. See Kauper, supra note 3, at 354; Note, Judicial
Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 3, at 1143-44.
Although I have not made a precise analysis, I suspect that synodical churches have caused
more difficult litigation than episcopal ones, because their democratic bases of governance suggest
a limit on the degree to which local churches are willing to completely relinquish authority to the
hierarchy, whose power comes from below and not from above. With congregational churches,
the legal controversy frequently focuses on whether or not the church is actually hierarchical.
Eg., Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 347, 254 S.E.2d 330, 332 (1979) (Jordan, J., dissenting);
Kelley v. Riverside Boulevard Independent Church of God, 44 IM. App. 3d 673, 681-88, 358
N.E.2d 696,702-07 (1976); State ex ret Morrow v. Hill, 51 Ohio St. 2d 74, 76-80, 364 N.E.2d 1156,
1158-60 (1977). See Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra
note 3, at 1158-64.
53. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 732-34.
54. "This principle would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church
laws, would open the way to all the evils which we have depicted as attendant upon the doctrine of
Lord Eldon, and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where property rights were concerned
the decision of all ecclesiastical questions." Id at 733-34.
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questioned the competency of the civil judge to rule upon points of
ecclesiastical law. According to the Court, civil judicial review of an
internal church decision would be "an appeal from the more learned
tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less
SO.
'
"
5 5
The Watson Court thus propounded a method for dispute resolution
and a view of church polity that would severely limit advertent judicial
interference with religious freedom. The resulting test, however, is not
a mechanical device to allocate property; it seeks to satisfy the expecta-
tions of churches and their members. By assuming that a church is
either hierarchical or congregational and that members totally submit
to church authority, the Court could easily maintain that complete def-
erence satisfies the parties' expectations.5 6
In rejecting the departure-from-the doctrine test, the Watson Court
rejected a highly intellectual definition of a church and the rights of its
members. Because the English test turned on doctrinal fidelity, it relied
on articulated church doctrine to define ecclesiastical authenticity and
the expectations of church members. In contrast, Watson set no doctri-
nal criteria, but instead relied on the internal church mechanism to se-
lect the criteria of its own choosing. The Court, then, did not assert
that dissidents should expect to lose because of doctrinal deviation. It
held instead that a church faction should accede to victory or defeat
because the faction knew that the ultimate decision rested with a speci-
fied church entity that applied its own criteria. Unlike the departure-
from-doctrine test, the criteria are not necessarily those of the church
founders (or what a court asserts to be the founders' criteria).57 There-
55. Id at 729.
56. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and
dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of contro-
verted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of
all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is
unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to
this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one
of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.
Id at 728-29.
Departure-from-doctrine, however, arguably is also a means of protecting religious liberty, be-
cause it assures that the courts will protect the religious use for which the property was given. By
blocking majority rule, it harmonizes the religious freedom of the church's contributors with insti-
tutional stability. See Kauper, supra note 3, at 351.
57. Departure-from-doctrine assumes that the donor intended the church's doctrine to re-
main static. The donor, however, may have had only a general charitable intent or perhaps an
[Vol. 59:1
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fore the expectations of contemporary church members need not con-
form to those of their predecessors; conformity occurs only if a
contemporary church organ has determined that conformity is critical.
The present day church, then, determines the criteria.
The assumption of implicit consent to church governance does not
require detailed doctrinal knowledge by church members, but merely
an acknowledgment of institutional authority, arguably a more likely
assumption. The requirement of doctrinal continuity thus gives way to
a required institutional continuity. Because Watson found implied
consent to internal governance, the Court assumed a continuing affilia-
tion with a particular form of governance and its decisionmaking cri-
teria. A disputing faction, then, should not expect either to set the
criteria for resolution or to determine the mechanism for resolution at
the time of the controversy. It must abide by its prior commitment to
the institution.
Watson's assumptions about expectations thus enabled it to recog-
nize a method of dispute resolution that avoids intrusion on religious
freedom. Its genius lies in its ability to uphold institutional autonomy
and yet satisfy an arguably valid set of expectations by churches and
their members.
B. Bouldin v. Alexander
In Bouldin v. Alexander58 the Supreme Court demonstrated that judi-
cial deference has limits. Faced with internal church proceedings of a
highly irregular nature, the Court was willing to deviate from Watson
to achieve a desired result. Bouldin can also be viewed as a precursor
to neutral principles analysis.
Legal title to the property of the Third Baptist Church in Washing-
ton, D.C., was held by four trustees. The congregation later elected
seven general trustees for the church and included in their number
three of the four property trustees. The congregation split into factions
shortly after the church's construction. At an irregularly called meet-
ing, Bouldin, who was the founding pastor, and a small minority of the
intent that the church change with the times. See Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511, 547-48 (1846)
(dicta); C. ZOLLMAN, supra note 3, at 158-59. The English rule also focuses on the intent of those
who originally made possible the church's physical facilities. It neglects the intent of those con-
tributors who contributed to the church's upkeep and expansion throughout the church's history
and whose respective intents likely depended on their times.
58. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
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congregation voted to turn out four property trustees and elect par-
tisans to the positions. The Bouldin faction apparently refused to rec-
ognize the earlier election of the seven general trustees and believed
that its action determined the identity of both the property trustees and
the general trustees. The general trustees and the ousted property trust-
ees sought an injunction and other relief to undo Bouldin's actions as-
serting control over church property.
The Supreme Court upheld a ruling against the Bouldin faction, but
denied that it was determining the identity of church officers. The
Court instead insisted that it was deciding only the legal ownership of
the property: "[Tlhe question respects temporalities, and temporalities
alone."59 According to the Court, the Bouldin faction tried to replace
the property trustees, as opposed to the church's general trustees. The
Court, which accepted the validity of the initial election of the seven
trustees, reasoned that any attempt to replace general trustees would
have contravened church election rules.60
As for the property trustees, they were not removable under trust
law, because the cestui que trust had shown no cause for removal. 6'
The Court further argued that even if the church had the right to sub-
stitute property trustees, no ecclesiastical authority had determined that
the Bouldin trustees were the legitimate title holders.62 Rejecting the
authority of the Bouldin faction, the Court stated:
[I]t may not be admitted that a small minority of the church, convened
without notice of their intention, in the absence of the trustees, and with-
out any complaint against them, or notice of complaint, could divest them
of their legal interest and substitute other persons to the enjoyment of
their rights.63
The Court thus rejected the Bouldin faction because of its minority
status and its flouting of regular procedures; whether either element
could independently negate an assertion of ecclesiastical authority is
unclear.
The Bouldin faction had also purported to excommunicate forty-one
members of the church. The Court conceded that the civil judiciary
lacked the power to question acts of church discipline even if the proce-
59. Id at 137.
60. Id at 138.
61. id at 137.
62. Id
63. id at 138.
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dure was irregular.' The Court, however, asserted its authority to as-
certain whether the Bouldin faction could act on the church's behalf. 5
According to the Court, in a congregational church the majority repre-
sents the church if it adheres to church organization and doctrine.66
Therefore the Bouldin faction's actions were not the actions of the
church. The Court further noted that even if the excommunications
had been valid, excommunication of the trustees would deprive them
of church membership but not of their positions as trustees.67
Although the Court decided Bouldin shortly after Watson, it made
no reference to the latter case.68 The analysis, nonetheless, reflected
Watson's concern with judicial intrusion into religious affairs. In de-
termining the identity of the property trustees, the Court began by ap-
plying a secular principle of trust law-the need for cause to justify
removal of trustees.6 9 An awareness of church autonomy, however,
compelled the Court to show that its decision would hold even if the
secular rule did not bind the church. The Court bolstered its reliance
on property law by noting the lack of an authoritative church ruling on
the subject.70 This conclusion permitted the Court to avoid determin-
ing what criteria the church should apply; however, it required the
Court to decide whether a particular church faction was the authorita-
tive church decisionmaker.
The Court rested its determination on general statements about the
lack of authority of a minority body following highly irregular proce-
dures,71 but it made no reference to specific church rules on decisional
authority. To identify the proper body for church governance-the
church trustees-the Court had to determine the validity of the initial
election by looking to church records and determining that the initial
trustees did not secede and forfeit their rights.72 The Court resolved
the secession issue by evaluating the trustees' conduct and noting the
recognition of the trustees by other religious bodies, including the affili-
64. Id at 139.
65. Id at 140.
66. Id
67. Id
68. The briefs of the parties also failed to address Watson. Only one brief even mentioned
Watson. See Brief for Appellee at 11, Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
69. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 137.
70. Id
71. Id at 138.
72. Id at 138-39.
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ate denomination.73
As for determining the validity of the excommunications, the Court
again avoided the substantive dispute by rejecting the authority of the
Bouldin faction. In doing so, the Court assumed majority rule.74 The
Court also indulged in another assumption about religious polity by
assuming that membership is not an essential prerequisite to trustee-
ship.7
5
Because the Court gave multiple justifications for the holding, the
extent to which the decision deviated from Watson is difficult to dis-
cern. Like Watson, the Bouldin Court recognized the authority of the
church to make its own determinations on doctrine and polity.7 6 Much
of the analysis rejects the authority of the Bouldin faction. Nonetheless
the Court employed a different method than it did in Watson. Given
the rejection of the Bouldin faction's authority, a Watson-oriented deci-
sion would next identify the legitimate church authority and defer to its
determination. If there were no determination, the Court might either
withhold decision until the authentic church authority had spoken or
assume that the status quo prior to Bouldin's attempted coup reflected
the authentic determination. In contrast, the Bouldin Court first argued
that a secular principle of trust law, the need for cause to remove trust-
ees, was dispositive. The Court thus applied a neutral principle of
property law to determine continuing title by those universally con-
ceded to have been initially the legitimate titleholders. Arguments
about the validity of the Bouldin faction's authority were only secon-
dary. Determinations about the validity of the status quo ante-the
identity of the general trustees and their nonsecession-were based not
on deference to church authority, but on substantive deliberations by
the Court.
As for the excommunication issue, the Court denied making a sub-
stantive determination on the merits, but instead claimed to determine
who authentically spoke for the church. Denial of the Bouldin faction's
authority would have been sufficient. To reach its conclusion, however,
the Court found it necessary to assume that in a congregational church,
the majority members rule, "if they adhere to the organization and the
73. Id at 139.
74. Id at 140.
75. Id
76. Id at 139.
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[church's] doctrines. . . ."I' So broad a presumption might have been
unnecessary if the Court had simply referred to existing church rules
that stipulated majority rule. The reference to doctrinal fidelity is curi-
ous because it hints at the viability of the departure-from-doctrine
test.78 The Court's presumption, then, was unnecessary and questiona-
ble.
Bouldin's deviations from Watson and its failure to discuss the case
77. Id at 140.
78. In 1874-75, Justice William Strong, the author of the Bouldin opinion, delivered two
lectures on church law at Union Theological Seminary. W. STRONG, Two LECTURES UPON THE
RELATIONS OF CIVIL LAW TO CHURCH POLITY, DISCIPLINE, AND PROPERTY (1875). Whether or
not he believed that Watson (in which he joined the majority) had fully rejected the English
departure-from-doctrine rule is unclear. As with Bouldin, the lectures make no reference to Wat-
son. Justice Strong, however, stated:
I think it may safely be asserted as a general proposition, that whenever questions of
discipline, of faith, of church rule, of membership, or of office, have been decided by the
church in its own modes of decision, civil law tribunals accept the decisions as final, and
apply them as made.
Id at 41-42. Yet, Justice Strong distinguished between church officers and trustees in whom legal
title is vested. He stated that courts would not undertake to determine the identity of church
officers, but would identify trustees: "They have charge of the temporalities only, not at all of the
spiritual interests." Id at 64. He thus left grounds for judicial review by permitting a distinction
between spiritual matters and property matters, the latter a potentially expansive category.
Justice Strong's notion of express trust permits considerable room in which to employ the de-
parture-from-doctrine test. In harmony with Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 723-24, he would
permit doctrinal inquiry when a deed, will, or other instrument expressly grants the property "for
the express purpose of maintaining a specified form of organization, or while it remains in a
particular ecclesiastical connection, or it may be conveyed to a church, the name of which implies
a certain form of church government." W. STRONG, supra, at 45-46. His definition of an express
trust is broader than Watson's seems to be. For example, he would have considered an express
trust a grant to a specified church, "for the erection and support of a German Reformed church
.... " Id at 55. According to Justice Strong, the trust would have two dimensions: "First, it is
for the use of a church that is German Reformed in its form of government, its order, and its
discipline. Secondly, it is for a church that holds the creed or articles of faith accepted by the
German Reformed Church generally when the grant was made." Id Yet Justice Strong recog-
nized the limits of the English rule, at least in the case of congregational churches:
Of course what I have said has no application to a case where the property is held by a
church, or religious society, with no specific trust attached to it, or with no other than
that it is for a religious use generally. Such cases sometimes arise in independent
churches, governed solely by themselves ....
Id at 59-60. Whether or not Justice Strong would have extended the above statement to hierar-
chical churches is unknown. Also unknown is the precise point at which he would distinguish
property held in express trust from property not so held.
Justice Strong, a deeply religious man, took a special interest in church affairs. See Teaford,
Toward a Christian Nation: Religion, Law, and Justice Strong, 54 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 422
(1976). His views, therefore, may represent a thoughtful statement on the contemporary under-
standing of Watson, an understanding narrower than might otherwise be thought. His views also
support the position of state courts that seemingly declined to follow Watson. See note 49 supra.
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make it difficult to insist that the decisions are harmonious. Both deci-
sions agree on a policy of judicial nonintervention, but Bouldin appears
to permit more judicial latitude in methodology and degree of intru-
sion.7 9 Later Supreme Court opinions' and some commentators s'
have generally ignored Bouldin's deviance from Watson and empha-
sized its requirement of orderly process and rudimentary fairness.
Given the opinion's failure to explain the deviance from Watson, its
multiple rationales, and its nonconstitutional basis, this general conclu-
sion is more significant than the opinion's niceties.
The case, however, offers another general contribution. It illustrates
a court relying in part on neutral principles of law to resolve a property
dispute and thus foreshadows the modem neutral principles analysis.
The use of neutral principles is particularly interesting, because it ap-
pears in a case that apparently views Watson as unhelpful or perhaps
irrelevant. This fact suggests the possibility of neutral principles as an
alternative 2 to the Watson approach. 3
79. Why the Bouldin Court ignored Watson is a purely speculative question. One possible
explanation might be that Watson faced no question about the church's structure and seat of
authority. In Bouldin ascertainment of authentic authority was a central issue. The Bouldin
Court, however, could easily have incorporated its inquiry into the Watson methodology: Ascer-
tain the true church authority and then defer to it. Another explanation might be that Watson
dealt with a hierarchical church and not with a congregational church, as did Bouldin. Watson's
dicta and holding, however, are plainly part of a comprehensive scheme designed to cover both
types of churches.
Still another explanation might distinguish the nature of the inquiries in the respective cases.
Although Watson limited judicial inquiry into a church tribunal's jurisdiction, it focused on
avoiding doctrinal questions. Perhaps the Court viewed the Bouldn inquiries as so unrelated to
theological doctrine that rigid rules limiting inquiry were unrequired. Watson may have ruled the
jurisdictional questions off limits only because they affected the outcome of a doctrinal decision.
The Court may have distinguished Bouldin's polity questions as organizational, as opposed to
doctrinal, at least for purposes of the case. If the Court made such a distinction, then the Court
expected a far narrower reading of Watson than it has received. This explanation, however, fails
to explain Bouldin's brief allusion to doctrinal fidelity.
Another explanation would focus on the blatantly unconvincing nature of Bouldin's claims.
The degree of irregularity did not lead the Court explicitly to find bad faith, but the Court's
language hinted strongly at highly questionable conduct. This conduct may have led the Court to
hold that Watson had no application to cases strongly hinting at unseemly conduct.
80. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
729 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memo-
rial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 n.6 (1969).
81. Eg., C. ZOLLMAN, slpara note 3, at 212; Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property
Disputes--Some Constitutional Considerations, supra note 3, at 212.
82. See also Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharps-
burg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370 n.4 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. In 1880, Bouldin again appeared before the court for a review of the settlement of ac-
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C. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
If Bouldin implied a narrowing of judicial deference, Gonzalez v. Ro-
man Catholic Archbishop84 articulated it. Gonzalez declared that eccle-
siastical discretion did not include the right to act arbitrarily or in bad
faith with impunity." Moreover, the decision incorporated this decla-
ration into the complete deference doctrine as a qualification of Wat-
son's holding.
In Gonzalez the Court affirmed dismissal of a complaint by a boy
who unsuccessfully sought appointment to a family-endowed chap-
laincy. Manila's Roman Catholic archbishop refused to make the
appointment because the petitioner failed to satisfy canon law qualifi-
cations for the position. The petitioner may have qualified under ca-
non law effective in 1820 when the chaplaincy was founded, but did not
qualify under canon law in effect at the time of the controversy. Justice
Brandeis deferred to church authority and stated his reasoning in a fre-
quently quoted passage:
In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the
proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affect-
ing civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as con-
clusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or
otherwise. Under like circumstances, effect is given in the courts to the
determinations of the judicatory bodies established by clubs and civil as-
sociations.86
counts between himself and the church trustees. Bouldin v. Alexander, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 330
(1880). The decision was to Bouldin's disfavor due to his refusal to cooperate fully in the settle-
ment proceedings. The case contains no discussion relevant to the analysis in this Article.
84. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
85. Id at 16.
86. Id at 16-17. The Court cited Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893)
(Taft, J.), afl'd, 92 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1899), in which the court found fatal a procedural irregularity
under church law in the adoption of a new church constitution. According to the court, nothing in
Watson required acquiescence to "an open and avowed defiance of the original compact, and an
express violation of it." 55 F. at 847-48. Brundage was cited approvingly in Barkley v. Hayes, 208
F. 319, 328 (W.D. Mo. 1913), afl'dub nom. Duvall v. Synod of Kansas, 222 F. 669 (8th Cir. 1915),
afl'dsub nom. Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1 (1918). There, however, the court found that the
church's procedures were sufficiently regular to pass judicial muster. 208 F. at 329-33. Judge
Isaac Redfield also previewed Gonzalez by asserting that courts will not interfere in internal
church matters "so long as they keep within the reasonable application of their own rules, which
were known to the members, or might have been learned by them, upon reasonable inquiry, at the
time of connecting themselves with the. . . church." 15 AM. L. REG. (24 U. PA. L. REV.) 264, 278
(1876).
Other courts also previewed Gonzalez. E.g., Barton v. Fitzpatrick, 187 Ala. 273, 65 So. 390
(1914) (procedural irregularity in replacing pastor); Bomar v. Mount Olive Missionary Baptist
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Justice Brandeis also ruled that the archbishop was correct in applying
canon law presently in effect, because the parties at the founding of the
chaplaincy implicitly intended as much.8 7
The statement of the three exceptions to Watson's rule of complete
deference was unelaborated; charges of fraud and collusion were not
raised in the case. When the Court discussed the applicability of mod-
em canon law to determine the applicant's qualifications, it arguably
was determining whether or not the archbishop had acted arbitrarily.
More likely, however, the Court was attempting to discern the
founder's intent concerning which canon law to apply and was not sec-
ond guessing an ecclesiastical determination on canon law. Once the
Court ascertained the founder's intent, it did not assess the archbishop's
determination under modem canon law.8  The canon law discussion
thus dealt with the terms of the trust-an inquiry permissible under
Watsonl 9 and not the possible arbitrariness of a church adjudication
on doctrine.
The Court characterized the parties' relationship as contractual and
based the exceptions to the Watson rule on the standards of civil con-
tract and associations law.90 It assumed that bad faith and arbitrari-
ness, as defined by civil law standards, are not part of the agreement by
which individuals submit to church authority. The Gonzalez dicta thus
has a basis in civil law. Although the Court occasionally cited Wat-
son,9 1 it never discussed the case's analysis or its concern about reli-
gious autonomy. Nonetheless, the case's holding is consonant with
Watson in that the Gonzalez Court avoided discussing theological is-
sues. Its discussion about which canon law to apply was designed only
Church, 92 Cal. App. 618, 268 P. 665 (1928) (questionable procedures amounting to fraud); Mous-
takis v. Hellenic Orthodox Soc'y, 261 Mass. 462, 159 N.E. 453 (1928) (statement that expulsion of
member without notice, opportunity to be heard, or valid reason would be void absent express
authority for arbitrary expulsion, although apparently no church regulations governed expulsion);
Jones v. State, 28 Neb. 495, 44 N.W. 658 (1890) (before expulsion, member must receive notice
and opportunity for defense even in absence of church rules governing expulsion); Hendryx v.
People's United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 84 P. 1123 (1906) (pastor could not validly expel member
in order to continue scheme to defraud church of its property).
87. 280 U.S. at 17.
88. The Court simply stated: "In concluding that Raul lacked the qualifications essential for
a chaplain the Archbishop appears to have followed the controlling Canon Law. There is not
even a suggestion that he exercised his authority arbitrarily." 1d at 18.
89. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 723-24.
90. 280 U.S. at 16. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
91. 280 U.S. at 16 & n.3.
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to discern the terms of the express trust. Given Watson's position that
courts must determine theological issues if necessary to enforce an ex-
press trust,92 the Gonzalez Court showed restraint in not delving further
into church law than it did.
Although Watson, Bouldin, and Gon;alez did not rest on constitu-
tional grounds, they disclosed a strong judicial preference for avoiding
doctrinal disputes. Bouldin and Gonzalez showed a willingness to in-
trude to stop bad faith or arbitrariness, but both cases exhibited re-
straint. Bouldin offered civil law reasons for its decision to the extent
possible,93 and Gonzalez offered a civil law analysis for nonintervention
and occasional intrusion. 94 The cases obviously demanded no hard
and fast rule against all intrusions. Instead, they demonstrated a con-
cern for protecting the rights of church members, although the stan-
dards for judging unacceptable church conduct were secularly based.
Watson permitted courts to decide doctrinal issues if necessary to
safeguard the expectations of the founders of express trusts. Bouldin
acted to stop the rule of an apparently rump church faction. Gonzalez
articulated three exceptions to safeguard church members' reasonable
expectations about the extent of their submission to church authority.
Nonetheless, the concern for church members did not overshadow con-
cern for the institutional church. Because of the assumptions that
church members submit to virtually plenary church authority and that
courts should not challenge church interpretations of doctrine or polity,
the challengers could prevail only if they could prove fraud, collusion,
or arbitrariness. The Gonzalez exceptions served as an outer limit to
the substance of the "contract ' 95 to which the parties agreed.96
92. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wal.) at 723-24.
93. See text accompanying notes 59-75 supra.
94. See 280 U.S. at 16.
95. Id
96. According to our research, aside from Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United
States v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill. 2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), only once
did a court overrule a church decision by expressly relying on Gonzalez. Hatcher v. South Caro-
lina Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, 267 S.C. 107, 226 S.E.2d 253 (1976) (church hierar-
chy acted arbitrarily in its substantive decision to dissolve a local church). Since Gonzalez, some
courts have decided cases on the basis of fatal procedural irregularities without relying on the
Supreme Court case. Trustees of Del Annual Conference of Union Am. Methodist Episcopal
Church v. Ennis, 27 Del. Ch. 1, 29 A.2d 374 (1942) (bishop unilaterally removed pastor instead of
employing trial before church tribunal as authorized by the church discipline); Coates v.
Parchman, 334 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (church elected officers without giving members
the required notice of meeting and in absence of full church membership); Briscoe v. Williams,
192 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) (single member, without required authorization, called spe-
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The analysis furnished by these cases remained unaltered until 1952
when the Supreme Court discerned the constitutional issue limiting ju-
dicial review of internal church disputes.97
D. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral
In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral98 the Supreme Court recognized
a constitutional prohibition on state interference in internal church af-
fairs. Although the decision introduced a new dimension of analysis, it
confirmed the vitality of the analysis that the prior cases employed.
After the Russian Revolution, a dispute broke out between the Mos-
cow-based Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox
churches in the United States. The latter group eventually declared
administrative autonomy,99 and the New York legislature recognized
its authority over churches and church property in the state.'00 The
New York courts relied on the statute and refused to recognize the right
of the archbishop appointed by Moscow to occupy the church's central
cathedral in the United States.' 0 ' The Supreme Court, however, invali-
dated the statute because it interfered with the first amendment's free
exercise guarantee.10 2
According to the Court, a legislative attempt to transfer property
cial business meeting to remove pastor); Mitchell v. Albanian Orthodox Diocese in Am., Inc., 355
Mass. 278, 244 N.E.2d 276 (1969) (procedural irregularities invalidated bishop's election; court
held the matter involved not church law but contract law); Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 53
Ohio Op. 2d 288, 120 N.E.2d 485 (1954) (member expelled without the full and impartial investi-
gation required by church constitution); cf. Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. First English Lutheran
Church, 47 F. Supp. 954, 964 (W.D. Okla. 1942), rev'don other grounds, 135 F.2d 701 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943) (dicta that in calling special meeting to consider withdrawal from
denomination, church should have given notice of meeting's purpose, even though church regula-
tions did not require notice of purpose); Markowitz v. St. Mary's Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 88
Pa. D. & C. 472, 474 (Lehigh County C.P. 1954) (members are entitled to notice and an opportu-
nity for defense, even though church by-laws make no provision for suspension or expulsion).
97. Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
98. Id
99. The American group comprised at least four-fifths of the Russian Orthodox churches in
the United States. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 276 A.D. 309, 322, 94 N.Y.S.2d 453, 464,
rev'd, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950), rev'd and remanded, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (Van Voorhis, J.,
dissenting). The facts of the case are quite complex. For detailed summaries, see Duesenberg,
Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Relious Issues, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 508, 516-22 (1959); Note, Judi-
cial Intervention in Church Property Disputes--Some Constitutional Considerations, .supra note 3, at
1123-24 & n.44.
100. N.Y. RELIGIOUS CORP. LAW §§ 105-08 (McKinney 1952) (amended 1971).
101. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 32-33, 96 N.E.2d 56, 74 (1950).
102. 344 U.S. at 115-16.
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from one church authority to another infringes on the religious free-
dom of the disfavored faction. 0 3 The Court rejected the argument that
the legislature gave control to the American church in order to carry
out faithfully the purposes of the religious trust and to thwart politi-
cally subversive activity by the Moscow church."°4 The Court noted
the lack of charges of such activity against any cleric and stated that the
remedy was action against individual subversives and not against the
organization to which they belonged. 10 5
To bolster its reasoning, the Court engaged in a lengthy recounting
of Watson and noted that although the case rested on nonconstitutional
grounds, it reflected the concerns of the first amendment. 1°6 Despite
the lengthy discussion, the Court entered a very specific holding: The
free exercise guarantee gives churches "[fireedom to select the clergy,
where no improper methods of choice are proven . .. " 107 The Court
accordingly held that the state cannot intrude "for the benefit of one
segment of a church. . . into the forbidden area of religious freedom
,,108
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior
judgment, but based its holding on New York common law instead of
on the statute.' °9 The court ruled that Soviet domination of the Mos-
cow patriarch prevented his American appointee from validly exercis-
ing the right to occupy the cathedral. The Supreme Court, however,
found that the premises underlying the court's decision were the same
as those underlying the statute. In a brief per curiam opinion, the
Court held that the judiciary could not engage in a form of state action
that is constitutionally forbidden to the legislature. 110
The peculiar facts of the case limit its applicability to typical church
property controversies. As the Court noted, the dispute entailed no in-
103. Id at 119.
104. Id at 116-19.
105. Id at 109-10.
106. "[Watson] radiates.. . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence
from secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine." Id at 116.
107. Id
108. Id at 119.
109. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 164 N.E.2d 687, 196 N.Y.S.2d 655
(1959), rey'd, 363 U.S. 190 (1960). The court held that Communist domination had made the
Moscow hierarchy an unfit trustee for the Cathedral. Id at 215-16, 164 N.E.2d at 701, 196
N.Y.S.2d at 674-75.
110. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
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trachurch controversy over faith or doctrine. I"' Despite the invocation
of Watson, then, the Court had no occasion to explicitly reject doctrinal
tests like departure-from-doctrine or to endorse the entire Watson
framework.
In rejecting the political rationale for legislative action, 112 however,
the Court engaged in an analysis somewhat analogous to an assessment
of whether a state is deciding a church dispute on theological grounds.
The state legislature had determined that the Moscow patriarchate had
become a tool of the Soviet government and that the American church
could more faithfully carry out the purposes of the religious trust. Thus
the legislative analysis accepted by the New York court suggested an
implied trust endangered not by doctrinal deviance but by political
domination. The legislation continued to recognize the Moscow
church's spiritual authority. The Court avoided determining whether
courts could recognize political dominance without theological over-
tones as a deviation from a religious trust (as opposed to an artificial
implied trust). It instead emphasized the state's authority to punish
subversive activity by affiliated individuals." 3
Although the Court's language is not precisely clear, it seems to deny
that a legislature possesses the power to prevent political endangerment
to a church. The Court stated that the New York legislative action
went far beyond protecting the church's trustees in discharging their
responsibilities and intruded upon the church's right to choose its hier-
archy. 14 It failed to state, however, whether the legislature could have
acted if it had devised a means for acting on its political concerns that
avoided constitutionally forbidden conduct or whether any such at-
tempt would have violated the first amendment. If the former, then
political concerns would provide a constitutional avenue for a state to
safeguard a church. An aggressive but deliberate court could use this
avenue to control a religious organization. The latter alternative, how-
ever, seems more likely. The tone of the opinion suggests that regula-
tion of individuals furnishes the state with a satisfactory means for
curbing undesirable conduct and that pursuit of the same goal by direct
church regulation would impermissibly impair free exercise. Thus just
as Watson forbade doctrinal justification for judicial intrusion, Kedroff
111. 344 U.S. at 120.
112. Id at 117-19.
113. Id at 109-10.
114. Id at 118-19.
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apparently banned political rationales for impairing ecclesiastical au-
tonomy.
Kedrofs most important contribution, of course, is its holding that
the free exercise clause protects churches from state interference with
doctrine, faith, and church government. 15 The Court, however, had
no occasion to constitutionalize Watson's rejection of the departure-
from-doctrine rule, and some state courts declined to find an implicit
constitutionalization in the opinion. 1 6 As for the tension between the
interests of church organizations and church members, the Court em-
phasized organizational rights, because the case dealt with competing
hierarchies and did not formally pit a dissident faction against a loyal-
ist faction. Nonetheless, the Court cited Gonzalez and stated that
churches have "[flreedom to select the clergy, where no improper meth-
ods of choice are proven ... . Thus the court limited church au-
tonomy with a secular based check to protect individuals against
organizational abuse.
The Kedroff Court recognized that free religious exercise is interde-
pendent with a church's right to control property. Under this analysis,
a legislature or court cannot always deal with the property dispute
without intruding on free exercise. Although Kedroff formally con-
cerned property rights, the Court declared that "the right to use St.
Nicholas Cathedral is strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government, the
power of the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian Orthodox
Church to appoint a ruling hierarch of the archdiocese of North
America."' 8 The incidental effect on property control was insufficient
115. State court cases prior to Kedroff often referred to national policies on religious freedom.
E.., Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 244, 32 So. 575, 579 (1902); Morris St. Baptist Church v.
Dart, 67 S.C. 338, 341, 45 S.E. 753, 754 (1903); Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 325-26, 18 S.W. 874,
879 (1892). Courts sometimes made direct reference to the first amendment's guarantee of reli-
gious freedom as a basis for nonintrusion into the religious domain. E.g., Clapp v. Krug, 232 Ky.
303, 304, 22 S.W.2d 1025, 1026 (1929); Moustakis v. Hellenic Orthodox Soe'y, 261 Mass. 462, 466,
159 N.E. 453, 455 (1928).
116. E.g., Holiman v. Dovers, 236 Ark. 460,366 S.W.2d 197, supplementing opinion at 236 Ark.
211, 366 S.W.2d 197 (1963); Sorrenson v. Logan, 32 Ill. App. 2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 713 (1961);
Huber v. Thorn, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962); Vogler v. Salem Primitive Baptist Church, 415
S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1967); Cantrell v. Anderson, 390 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1965); Davis v. Sher, 356 Mich.
291, 97 N.W.2d 137 (1959). These cases all employ a departure-from-doctrine test; none mentions
Kedroff or the possibility of a constitutional problem with evaluating conformity with church
doctrine.
117. 344 U.S. at 116.
118. Id at 115.
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to justify state intrusion." 9 Perhaps the conclusion implicitly recog-
nized that the distinction between religious and property rights is some-
times illusory and merely a pragmatic way to resolve aspects of a
dispute that affect the orderliness of society. A court, of course, deter-
mines a result, whether the Constitution compels the acceptance of a
church body's authority or permits another standard, perhaps a judi-
cially created one. The distinction between property and religious is-
sues merely helps decide how much flexibility the court has in settling
the dispute.
Kedroff is a major case. Not only does it anchor Watson's general
policy to a judicially enforceable constitutional rule,120 it incorporates
the major aspects of the preceding cases-judicial deference with the
qualifications suggested in Bouldin and articulated in Gonzalez-and
does not reject any parts of those holdings. It recognizes the necessity
of religious autonomy for church organizations, but still acknowledges
a marginal role for judicial review and perhaps other state action to
secure the expectations of church members.
E. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presby-
terian Church"'2 the Supreme Court rendered the modern landmark
decision on church property disputes. Kedroff had launched the mod-
em analysis by raising the constitutional dimension and speaking ap-
provingly of prior decisions. Presbyterian Church applied the first
amendment to a typical internal church dispute. Although it did not
apply Watson's method of resolution, it elevated to constitutional
principle Watson's rule of noninterference with church doctrine.' 22
In Presbyterian Church two Savannah, Georgia, congregations voted
to disaffiliate from the Presbyterian Church of the United States, pri-
119. Justice Frankfurter emphasizes this point in his concurring opinion:
St. Nicholas Cathedral is not just a piece of real estate. . . . A cathedral is the seat and
center of ecclesiastical authority. St. Nicholas Cathedral is an archiepiscopal see of one
of the great religious organizations. What is at stake here is the power to exercise reli-
gious authority. That is the essence of this controversy.
Id. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
120. One commentator argues that the Kedroff Court could have avoided invoking the free
exercise clause by basing its decision on an unconstitutional taking of property from the Moscow
church. See Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes, supra note 3, at 1128-30.
121. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
122. Id at 447.
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marily because they opposed politically liberal stands that the denomi-
nation had taken. 2 After intrachurch proceedings failed to produce
reconciliation, the dissenters claimed ownership of church property. In
the Georgia courts they successfully argued that the denomination's
conduct constituted substantial departures from doctrine in force at the
time of affiliation.' 24 The Georgia courts, which still adhered to the
departure-from-doctrine rule, found that the implied trust favoring the
denomination had terminated. 25 The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court recognized the factual parallel with Watson and endorsed
Watson's concern for religious freedom. It concluded that "[tihe logic
of [the Watson] language leaves the civil courts no role in determining
ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property dis-
putes." ' 26 More specifically, the Court stated that Kedroff had "con-
verted the principle of Watson as qualified by Gonzalez into a
constitutional rule."'' 27
The Court nonetheless noted that courts could decide church prop-
erty disputes if they could do so without resolving underlying doctrinal
controversies. 2  The opinion also marks the first use of the phrase
"neutral principles" in church property cases-"[T]here are neutral
principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can
be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is
awarded."'' 29  No further elaboration was offered. Although later
Court opinions have treated neutral principles as a methodology sepa-
123. Id at 442-43. The complaints concerned liberalization of such doctrinal matters as fore-
ordination and the ordination of women as ministers and elders as well as the liberal stands taken
by the denomination on civil disobedience and opposition to the Vietnam War. Presbyterian
Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 224 Ga. 61, 62-64, 159 S.E.2d 690, 692-93 (1968),
summarized in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 442 n.l (1969).
124. In the trial court, a jury made the initial determination, and, on appeal, the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 224 Ga.
61, 62-63, 159 S.E.2d 690, 692-93 (1968).
125. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the test was "substantial abandonment" of the
original tenets of faith and practice, and stated that "substantial" was synonymous with "funda-
mental," "material," "vital," and "important." Id at 70, 159 S.E.2d at 696. The court noted that
this test was less burdensome on the local church than a test requiring a showing of complete
abandonment. Id The court therefore overruled a prior Georgia case adopting the complete
abandonment test. Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S.E. 184 (1907). Georgia decisions, however, had
not strictly applied the Mack test. See Casad, supra note 3, at 58.
126. 393 U.S. at 447 (emphasis in original).
127. Id at 447.
128. Id at 449.
129. Id
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rate from Watson's methodology of compulsory deference,' 30 the Court
probably would not have made such an innovation without being more
specific about what it was doing. In context, the Court appears to be
stating only that the civil judiciary can resolve at least some church
property disputes without resorting to doctrinal inquiry. Thus the pas-
sage could easily be a descriptive statement about the Watson method-
ology rather than a statement of a new methodology.1
3 1
The Court specifically invalidated the departure-from-doctrine ele-
ment in Georgia's implied trust theory. 132 The test's fatal flaws were
the requirements that courts interpret church doctrine and that they
assess its relative significance to the religion.' 33 Given the Court's ex-
plicit ban on doctrinal inquiry, either flaw would seem to be fatal. The
Court made its ban on departure-from-doctrine absolute 134 by declar-
ing that courts could not use Gonzalez to invoke the test as evidence of
arbitrary decisionmaking or bad faith.'
35
On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court held that without the depar-
ture-from-doctrine element, the entire implied trust theory must fall. 36
Finding no other basis for a trust favoring the denomination, the court
looked to legal title, found that it rested with the local churches, and
made this fact dispositive. 137
Presbyterian Church thus constitutionalized Watson's prohibition on
130. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 599, 602-03 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for
the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723 n.15 (1976); Maryland & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
131. On the confusion created by the Court's language, see, e.g., Casad, supra note 3, at 68;
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 128-29 & n.19 (1969).
132. 393 U.S. at 449-50.
133. Id at 450.
134. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan agreed that the departure-from-doctrine ap-
proach is unconstitutional, but made a separate statement about express trusts. He stated that an
individual may grant property to a church and attach enforceable conditions that limit doctrinal
change. Id at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring). The examples Justice Harlan gave, however, indicate
that the conditions he had in mind would not involve a court in a doctrinal inquiry-that the
church never ordain women or amend specific articles of the Confession of Faith. Even these
conditions, however, could conceivably give rise to doctrinal dispute. For example, the church
could claim to be clarifying or rewording an article, but still face charges that it had made a
substantive change. In such a case, presumably the Court's rule against judicial review of doctri-
nal questions would apply. See Casad, supra note 3, at 60-61.
135. 393 U.S. at 450-51.
136. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 260, 167
S.E.2d 658, 659 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
137. Id at 260-61.
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doctrinal inquiry and accepted the Gonzalez exceptions for marginal
review. More specifically, it outlawed the departure-from-doctrine in-
quiry. The decision, however, did not speak to the rest of Watson's
holding. The Court made no reference to a rule of compulsory defer-
ence and did not categorize churches as either congregational or hier-
archical. Thus the case did not foreclose other methods for dispute
resolution.
The Court's constitutional concerns focused on protecting church au-
tonomy to permit free development of doctrine and to avoid implicat-
ing secular interests in matters of ecclesiastical concern. By eliminating
one weapon formerly available to dissidents, Presbyterian Church
weakened doctrinal stability, but enhanced institutional stability. By
assuming the implied consent of members to church governance, the
Court reconciled its institutional emphasis with the reliance interests of
church members. Only its approval of the Gonzalez exceptions showed
a direct concern for dissidents.
The Court made clear that it viewed the major problem as one of
ambiguity in legal documents and church documents. It therefore
called upon the state, the churches, and individuals to structure their
relationships so that civil courts could resolve property disputes with-
out engaging in forbidden ecclesiastical inquiry. 138 Courts, of course,
must resolve these disputes to insure the civil order of society, but Pres-
byterian Church may imply that courts cannot decide these cases ac-
cording to the expectations of churches and their members if the
evidence necessary to resolve ambiguities is constitutionally off limits.
F. Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.
Shortly after the Court decided Presbyterian Church, it remanded a
case to the Maryland Court of Appeals for further consideration in
light of the recent decision. 39 On remand, the state court affirmed its
prior opinion,140 and the Supreme Court agreed per curiam.' 4' The
138. 393 U.S. at 449.
139. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
249 Md. 650, 241 A.2d 691 (1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528 (1969).
140. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969).
141. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
396 U.S. 367 (1970).
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case, Maryland & Virginia Eldershio of the Churches of God v. Church of
God at Sharpsburg, Inc., marks the first time the Court approved a state
court decision purporting to apply neutral principles. Perhaps more
significant is a concurring opinion by Justice Brennan that seeks to
summarize the current state of the law on church property dispute.
142
In approving both the Watson and neutral principles methods, Justice
Brennan emphasized that the first amendment affords the states broad
discretion in formulating a method of resolution.
In Maryland & Virginia Eldershiq two local congregations withdrew
from the general church and claimed ownership of church property.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Maryland court affirmed its
prior decision favoring the local churches and declared that its reason-
ing included no consideration of doctrinal issues. 143 The court focused
on Presbyterian Church's reference to neutral principles and asserted
that its prior opinion had anticipated the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion. 144
The court looked to the state statute, the express language of the
property deeds, the local church charters as well as the constitutions of
the Eldership and the general church. The first three sources vested
property control in the local churches, and the constitutions failed to
place control of the property in the general church. According to the
court, it applied neutral principles because none of the inquiries re-
quired a determination on any theological or doctrinal matter. 45 The
court, however, recognized the need to explain its reliance on the stat-
ute. The Maryland Religious Corporation Law placed control of
church property in the local churches. 46 Recognizing the first amend-
ment challenge, the court noted that a religious corporation with local
control could still contract to adopt a hierarchical polity and effectively
transfer control to the denomination. 4
7
142. Id at 368.
143. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
254 Md. 162, 172-73, 254 A.2d 162, 169 (1969).
144. Id at 166, 254 A.2d at 165.
145. Id at 173, 254 A.2d at 169.
146. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 256-70 (Michie 1973 replacement vol.). The statutes have
since been revised, but essentially without substantive change as they relate to this discussion.
MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 5-301 to -313 (Michie 1975 & cum. supp. 1979).
147. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
254 Md. 162, 172-73, 254 A.2d 162, 169-70 (1969) (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 249 Md. 650, 673-74, 241 A.2d 691, 704-
05 (1968)).
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In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed.1 48 The
Court merely noted the sources on which the state decision relied,
made a specific reference to the challenge to the statute's constitutional-
ity as applied, and concluded that the Maryland court's resolution in-
volved no inquiry into religious doctrine.
The decision's status as a per curiam opinion raises some question
about which aspects of the Maryland opinion received full validation.
The Court's summary of the state court's methodology, however, sug-
gests a general approval. 149 In applying a neutral principles approach,
the state court asked not where the locus of authority lay, but who
owned the property. Thus the Court apparently approved a method
that differed from Watson.
The Court's conclusion that no doctrinal inquiry was present has sev-
eral implications. It atirms that courts can interpret secular provisions
of church documents, apparently on the assumption that they can be
isolated from doctrinal inquiry. More intriguing is the approval of the
way that the Maryland court interpreted two church deeds. The docu-
ment vested title in the general church "in the event the congregation of
the Church of God at Sharpsburg, Maryland, ceases to function as a
church organization. . .. ,150 One deed of the other local church like-
wise gave the property to the general church "if the [local] church
should become extinct or cease to be. .. ," 1 According to the state
court, these provisions did not give title to the general church should
the local church disaffiliate. 152 Although the reading is certainly ac-
ceptable, a religious question is arguably involved-whether a church
that withdraws from a general church ceases to exist. From the general
church's viewpoint, apostasy might be the equivalent of nonexistence.
Although the language may appear in a legal document, its meaning
148. 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
149. In resolving a church property dispute. . . the Maryland Court of Appeals relied
upon provisions of state statutory law governing the holding of property by religious
corporations, upon language in the deeds conveying the properties in question to the
local church corporations, upon the terms of the charters of the corporations, and upon
provisions in the constitution of the General Eldership pertinent to the ownership and
control of church property.
id at 367 (footnote omitted).
150. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
249 Md. 650, 665, 241 A.2d 691, 700 (1968) (emphasis omitted).
151. Id (emphasis omitted).
152. 1d; accord, Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 Md. 162, 169, 254 A.2d 162, 167 (1969).
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might still hinge on doctrine. The problem illustrates the difficulty in
separating doctrinal from secular language.
The Court's approval of the application of the Maryland statute is
also noteworthy. The statute effectively mandated a congregational
polity unless the church took the initiative to create another arrange-
ment. 153 The Court may have believed that state requirements con-
cerning property ownership involved no religious intrusion. The thrust
of Supreme Court cases, however, suggests that the Court would not
take so narrow a view, but would recognize the relationship between
property ownership, church polity, and religious freedom.154 Alterna-
tively, the Court may have determined that the church polity was con-
gregational and that the statute therefore did no violence to it. If this
were the Court's reasoning, the opinion gives no indication that the
Court took this course. The Maryland court's interpretation of the stat-
ute, however, seems an acceptable one for the Court to have ap-
proved.' 55 The state court essentially viewed the statute as a device for
assuring civil order in the absence of other arrangements by the church.
Local ownership would prevail only if the absence of other arrange-
ments compelled a court to resolve an ambiguous state of affairs. The
statute would create a presumption when other evidence is lacking. A
church's freedom to arrange its affairs would remain unfettered, but
church failure to take responsibility would invoke a provision for deter-
mining property ownership and preserving civil order.'
56
The case thus suggests that the first amendment gives courts some
latitude in devising resolutions for church disputes. Whether the Mary-
land approach reflected the expectations of churches and their mem-
153. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 256-70 (Michie 1973 replacement vol.). The statutes have
since been revised, but essentially without substantive change as they relate to this discussion.
MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 5-301 to -313 (Michie 1975 & cum. supp. 1979).
154. See notes 118-19 supra and accompanying text.
155. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
254 Md. 162, 166-67, 254 A.2d 162, 166 (1969) (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 249 Md. 650, 656, 241 A.2d 691, 695-96
(1969)).
156. For an extensive discussion of religious corporation laws, see Kauper & Ellis, Religious
Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1499 (1973). Although these statutes seem to regu-
late churches, they establish conditions under which churches can enjoy the autonomy guaranteed
by the first amendment. The statutes give churches the benefits of incorporation, but still permit
the flexibility needed to accommodate each church's peculiar structure. See Giannella, supra note
9, at 536-37. On the constitutionality of religious corporation statutes, see Kauper & Ellis, supra,
at 1557-74.
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bers was unaddressed. At best, the Maryland court assumed that legal
and secular documents combined with the church's failure to upset the
statutory arrangement reflected expectations.
Of more significance than the per curiam opinion is a concurring
opinion by Justice Brennan in which Justices Douglas and Marshall
joined.'57 The frequently quoted concurrence makes no reference to
the Maryland case, but instead sets out an innovative summary of the
law. According to Justice Brennan, states need not conform to the Wat-
son methodology.'58 They can adopt any approach for settling church
property disputes provided it entails no consideration of doctrinal mat-
ters.'5 9 "Doctrinal matters" include the ritual and liturgy of worship
and the tenets of faith.' 60
Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Brennan made clear that ecclesias-
tical polity must remain entirely within church control.' 6' Watson's
deference to a church's internal decisional mechanism-whether the
church is congregational or hierarchical-was recognized.' 62 Justice
Brennan also agreed that an express condition might attach to prop-
erty's use and control, as in the case of an express trust; the condition,
however, would be judicially enforceable only if a court could address
it without considering doctrinal matters. 163
The concurrence would permit a court following Watson to identify
the church's governing body, but not to determine whether it had the
power under religious law to control the property in question. The lat-
ter inquiry would violate the first amendment because it "frequently
necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous language and usage."'
According to Justice Brennan, the first amendment also limits a court
in identifying the governing body; the court can make the identification
only if it does not resolve doctrinal questions or inquire extensively into
church polity.' 65
Justice Brennan also described neutral principles as an alternative to
157. 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
162. I.d at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring).
163. Id at 369 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
164. Id at 369 (Brennan, J., concurring).
165. Id at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the Watson approach. 16 6 He equated it with the formal title doctrine
and thus created some ambiguity. 167 Justice Brennan first stated that a
court could "determine ownership by studying deeds, reverter clauses,
and general state corporation laws."' 168 The lack of reference to secular
provisions in church documents suggested the analysis would be lim-
ited to ascertaining legal title and trusts that are expressly set out in
legal documents. Justice Brennan, however, then illustrated that the
ban on doctrinal inquiry limits neutral principles: "For example, pro-
visions in deeds or in a denomination's constitution for the reversion of
local church property to the general church, if conditioned upon a find-
ing of departure from doctrine, could be civilly enforced."' 169 The sen-
tence suggests provisions of church documents susceptible to a secular
reading are also permissible sources of information. A narrower read-
ing would limit the sources' use to construing the conditions and rever-
sions that accompany express trusts. Later decisions bear out the
broader interpretation, 70 but the ambiguity in Justice Brennan's lan-
guage suggests that the neutral principles doctrine was not entirely for-
mulated at the time of Maryland & Virginia Eldership.
The endorsement of the formal title doctrine is curiously brief. The
concurring opinion marks the first time that any justices gave it express
approval.'71 The highly legalistic nature of the test might have created
the incentive for an elaboration on how it squared with any concern for
meeting the expectations of the parties. Satisfying those expectations
might well require a court to look to evidence beyond the words of the
document. 17
2
Justice Brennan also suggested that the Watson and neutral princi-
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id
169. Id
170. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
171. Previously, courts had occasionally looked to formal title. E.g., First English Lutheran
Church v. Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 135 F.2d 701 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943);
Master v. Second Parish, 124 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941); Bonacum v. Murphy, 71 Neb. 463, 104
N.W. 180 (1905).
172. For this reason, several courts have rejected the formal title doctrine. Eg., Lowe v. First
Presbyterian Church, 56 Ill. 2d 404, 408, 308 N.E.2d 801, 803, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974);
Presbytery of Cimarron v. Westminster Presbyterian Church, 515 P.2d 211, 216-17 (Okla. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Presbytery of Seattle v. Rohrbaugh, 79 Wash. 2d 367, 372, 485
P.2d 615, 619 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 996 (1972).
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ples methods were complementary.' 73 Thus, a neutral principles court
that encountered a doctrinal snag might resort to the Watson method,
and a Watson court that faced a doctrinal question might turn to neu-
tral principles. If both methods led to a doctrinal matter, presumably
courts could resort to some undescribed third method. Justice Brennan
did not limit approved methodologies to two. Another alternative
would be to make a decision under Watson or neutral principles, but
only on whatever evidence was not constitutionally off limits. Justice
Brennan's language, however, presumed that recourse to other methods
was the appropriate procedure.' 74
Justice Brennan's concurrence also mentioned an additional ap-
proach-special statutes that govern property arrangements without re-
quiring reference to doctrine.' 75 He made clear that the statutes must
reflect ecclesiastical polity rather than dictate it.'76 He left unanswered
whether under any circumstances a statute might dictate a solution
when the church's method of resolution is unclear. The obvious paral-
lel is the Maryland statute, which might create a presumption of a par-
ticular polity in the absence of other evidence. Not until Jones v.
Wofff 77 did a Court majority explicitly permit this sort of statutory pre-
sumption.
Despite its ambiguities, then, the Brennan concurrence marked an
important step in judicial thinking about church property disputes. It
revealed members of the Court willing to give considerable latitude to
the states in devising methods of dispute resolution. The constitutional
ban on doctrinal inquiry, according to the concurring justices, did not
mandate adherence to a particular methodology. At the same time, the
Justices gave specific approval to the Watson methodology as conso-
nant with the Constitution.
G. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v.
Milivojevich
Although Maryland & Virginia Eldership indicated that states had
173. 396 U.S. at 370 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring).
174. See id
175. Id at 370.
176. Id Justice Brennan cited as illustrations, however, two cases that invalidated statutes as
unconstitutional. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Goodson v. Northside
Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966), aft'd, 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967).
177. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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latitude in designing methods for dispute resolution, Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich ' demonstrated
that limitations on latitude still existed. Serbian held that the limita-
tions imposed by the first amendment were, in one respect, narrower
than had previously been believed. The Court held unconstitutional
judicial review of internal church decisions for arbitrariness, a standard
of review first accepted in Gonzalez. 79 As a setting for the holding, the
Court selected a factually complex case that concerned not the defec-
tion of a single local congregation, but the schism of a hierarchical
church.
The Serbian Orthodox Church, based in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, is a
hierarchical church, and the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod are its
highest authorities. After a protracted dispute, these bodies defrocked
Dionisijie Milivojevich, the Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese.
They also reorganized his diocese into three dioceses. In the Illinois
courts,' Milivojevich successfully argued that he should retain control
of diocesan property. He asserted that the defrockment failed to con-
form to the procedure prescribed in the church constitution and that
the diocesan reorganization was beyond the jurisdictional authority of
the mother church's tribunals. The Supreme Court reversed and held
that courts must defer to the rulings of a church's highest tribunals on
matters of "discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law."' 8' The Court also confirmed Watson's ruling that
civil courts cannot challenge church tribunals on the jurisdiction they
claim.'82 In issuing this broad holding, the Court outlawed civil review
for arbitrariness, a review that Gonzalez would have permitted.
Although Kedroff'I 3 and Presbyterian Church18 4 both gave general
approval to Watson's principles, Serbian marks the first time since Wat-
178. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
179. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. at 16.
180. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 60 II1. 2d 477,
328 N.E.2d 268 (1975); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Ocokolich, 72
Ill. App. 2d 444, 219 N.E.2d 343 (1966). The dispute produced other litigation. Draskovich v.
Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of St. De-
metrius v. Keleman, 21 Ohio St. 2d 154, 256 N.E.2d 212, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); Drage-
livich v. Rajsich, 24 Ohio App. 2d 59, 263 N.E.2d 778 (1970).
181. 426 U.S. at 713.
182. Id at 713-14.
183. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. at 110-16.
184. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. at 445-47.
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son that the Court approvingly described the specifics of the Watson
methodology, at least as it applies to hierarchical churches.'85 The
Court emphasized Watson's statement that the final authority of church
judicatories is "of the essence of these religious unions and of their
right to establish tribunals ... .186 Thus the focus was on the rights
of the church as an institution.
The Serbian Court also lodged a severe challenge to the Gonzalez
qualifications on Watson. Noting that it had never given the holding
"concrete content" or applied the exception, the Court held that an ar-
bitrariness exception is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement
of deferral on religious questions.1 87 According to the Court, an arbi-
trariness inquiry-defined as "an inquiry whether the decisions of the
highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with
church laws and regulations"' 8 ---entails an unconstitutional examina-
tion of either church procedural law or church substantive criteria. The
Court analogized to Watson's rejection of inquiries into the jurisdiction
of tribunals; Watson argued that the investigation would lead to a con-
struction of church laws.' 89 The Serbian Court recognized that Gonza-
lez presumed to protect the expectations of church members, but the
Court also recognized that such expectations are not necessarily reason-
able. The Court declared that ecclesiastical decisions "are to be ac-
cepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by
objective criteria."' 190 Consequently, the Court saw no role for the con-
stitutional concept of due process, which is a secular notion.' 91
The Supreme Court also overruled the Illinois court's challenge to
the Belgrade hierarchy's tripartite division of the diocese.192 Although
the Illinois court certainly was aware that Watson had outlawed chal-
lenges to a tribunal's jurisdiction, it argued that here the tribunal acted
"in clear and palpable excess of its own jurisdiction," 193 thus indicating
185. 426 U.S. at 710-11, 724-25 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727).
186. Id at 711 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729).
187. Id at 712-13.
188. Id at 713.
189. Id at 713-14 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733-34).
190. Id at 714-15.
191. "Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of 'fundamental fair-
ness' or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical
cognizance." Id at 715.
192. Id at 720-24.
193. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 60 II 2d 477,
509, 328 N.E.2d 268, 284 (1975).
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invocation of the Gonzalez rule.194 The Court, however, glided over
the invocation and held that such matters rest solely with the church
government. 19
5
Serbian dealt with an undisputedly hierarchical church, but it set out
rules that would seem to apply to all forms of church polity. Although
the Court specifically limited its holding to cases concerning hierarchi-
cal churches, 196 it disclosed no rationale for this limitation. The lim-
itation therefore may have been the result of traditional judicial
conservatism in deciding only the case before the bar or it may have
meant that the Court had reservations about complete deferral to con-
gregational churches.
The degree of deferral to hierarchical churches concerned some
members of the Court. Justice White wrote a brief concurrence to state
the role of independent judicial judgment. 97 According to Justice
White, courts determine whether or not a church is hierarchical and
whether a church body like the American-Canadian Diocese is part of
a hierarchical church, regardless of the opinions of church authorities
on the subject. He thus reserved some basic questions of church polity
for the civil court's determination. Justice Rehnquist, accompanied by
Justice Stevens, issued a dissent that challenged the extent of judicial
194. The court cited Schweiker v. Husser, 146 III. 399, 415, 34 N.E. 1022, 1030 (1893), which
recited the essential Gonzalez rule, but failed to find a violation in the case at bar.
195. 426 U.S. at 721. The Court said that the Illinois decision was not explicitly based on the
Gonzalez exception, but was based on a "neutral principles" analysis that erroneously substituted
the court's interpretation of church constitutions for that of the church authorities. Id The Illi-
nois court, however, analyzed the church documents to determine whether or not church authori-
ties had acted arbitrarily in asserting jurisdiction.
The Court also strongly suggested that the Illinois court was wrong in its analysis of church
jurisdiction. Id at 721-24. The Court, however, made the puzzling statement that "[t]he constitu-
tional provisions of the American-Canadian Diocese were not so express that the civil courts could
enforce them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church
polity." Id at 723. The statement could easily imply that sometimes a court may look to the
jurisdiction of a church tribunal. This conclusion, however, falls to comport with the rest of the
opinion. In a footnote tied to the sentence, the Court noted that the formal title doctrine had not
been invoked in the case. Id at 723 n.15. Even if it were, however, the Court would have con-
strued secular provisions not to ascertain a tribunal's jurisdiction, but instead to determine the
owner of the property. The placement of the footnote, then, raises unanswered questions. The
only possible, consistent interpretation would hold that the provisions of a church document are
never sufficiently express to permit a jurisdictional inquiry. The wording, however, seems to sug-
gest more. Exactly what it implies remains an enigma.
196. Id at 724.
197. Id at 725.
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deference.' 98 Justice Rehnquist argued that an inquiry into arbitrari-
ness is not a great jump from the inquiries that a court can permissibly
make in discerning the decision that a church tribunal has made. 199 He
thus argued that some factual inquiry is inevitable, that the determina-
tion of these controversies requires some criterion, and that the rule of
law that forbids arbitrariness is a proper criterion.
Under the pre-Kedroff common-law doctrine, Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued, the Illinois courts correctly addressed a question assumed in Wat-
son-"whether the members of the American-Canadian Diocese had
bound themselves to abide by the decisions of the Mother Church in
the matters at issue here."2" He thus looked to the members' expecta-
tions to justify the Gonzalez inquiry. As for the post-Kedroff constitu-
tional cases, Justice Rehnquist viewed them as requiring that courts not
favor a particular doctrine or sect.20 1 He apparently believed that
courts can make determinations about internal religious organizations
providing they do not violate the constitutional requirements and in-
stead apply neutral principles. He even suggested that deferral on such
matters, which is not accorded secular voluntary organizations, creates
an establishment clause problem.20 2
Serbian marked the first time that at least some Court members dis-
played uneasiness with the Watson method. The facts of the case
forced the Court to accept consequences that flow from recognizing
that the nonentanglement principle extends beyond doctrine to polity.
198. Id at 725-35. A few years after Serbian, however, Justice Rehnquist approvingly cited
Serbian for the proposition that: "[T]he Constitution places a higher value on religious freedom
than it does upon neutral resolution of disputes which may arise between factions within a
church." Rehnquist, The.4dversary Society, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 5 (1978). In reply, Professor
Tribe invoked Serbian to illustrate a "pluralistic fallacy" militating against judicial review. Ac-
cording to Tribe, the fallacy of internal fairness is "[the assumption] without any real inquiry that
the internal processes of the group to which litigants are remitted will give fair consideration to the
interests and rights of such litigants." Tribe, Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In Defense ofthe Adversary
Process-A Reply to Justice .Rehnquist, 33 U. MIAMi L. REv. 43, 47 (1978). Tribe's discussion of
Serbian seems critical. Md at 49-50. His discussion of the case in his treatise, however, seems
neutral, if not positive. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 878-80.
199. 426 U.S. at 726-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
200. Id at 732 n.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
201. Id at 733 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
202. To make available the coercive powers of civil courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical
decisions of hierarchical religious associations, when such deference is not accorded sim-
ilar acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free exercise problems
petitioners envision, itself create far more serious problems under the Establishment
Clause.
Id at 734 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
42 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The breadth of ecclesiastical immunity forbade an arbitrariness test
and raised doubts about review for fraud and collusion, traditional
tools of the courts. Thus the nonentanglement principle resulted in an
extensive loss of civil judicial power.
The constitutional concern justifying immunity extended beyond
civil interference to the hazard of civil interference.20 3 The Court, how-
ever, failed to identify the point at which the hazard is outweighed by
the threat of unwarranted church domination over its members. A pre-
cise balancing test may prove impossible because determining when the
threat becomes unacceptably imminent is an inherently imprecise un-
dertaking. The Court identified unacceptable threats in a less analytic
way. It declared that some judicial inquiries were permissible, at least
until doctrinal matters intrude-for example, identifying the church as
hierarchial-and it entirely outlawed other inquiries-for example,
those concerning internal church organization and procedural regular-
ity.
Justice Rehnquist recognized the artificiality of the distinction be-
tween permissible and impermissible topics for inquiry and proposed
outlawing inquiry only when a court must look to church doctrine.
Justice Rehnquist's test would permit broader judicial review, but
would increase the hazard of unwitting intrusion. In striking a balance
between the threat of unwarranted church domination and the desira-
bility of church autonomy, however, he failed to explain why his test
offered the preferable balance. Perhaps an awareness of the unsatisfac-
tory nature of these tests explains why the majority limited its holding
to hierarchical churches, the case at hand.
Both the majority and the dissenters justified their holdings in terms
of member expectations. The majority assumed that members accept
the decisions of church authority as an act of faith.2" The dissent,
however, was willing to examine and determine church polity to ascer-
tain the expectations of members.20 5 It accepted Gonzalez's inquiries as
203. "Even when rival church factions seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil
courts there is substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious
controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs." id at 709.
"If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute,
the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of impli-
cating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern." Id at 710 (quoting Presbyte-
rian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449).
204. Id at 714-15.
205. Id at 733-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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a permissible method to define the outer limits of what a court will
assume church members have submitted to. For the dissent, then, the
expectations of members are a proper topic for factual inquiry.
The majority dashed any hopes that neutral principles as a part of a
Watson test could permit broader constitutional review to better ascer-
tain the legitimate expectations of churches and their members. The
Illinois court had described its inquiry into internal church organiza-
tions and jurisdiction as an application of neutral principles.2°6 It ap-
parently defined neutral principles as inquiry not based on doctrine or
favoritism toward one faction. The Court's veto of the Illinois method-
ology on Watson-style grounds suggests that, at least here, the phrase
"neutral principles," as employed in Presbyterian Church,2 °7 did not
broaden judicial review under the Watson methodology. Neutral prin-
ciples thus offered only a separate methodology. Yet, thus far, majority
opinions of the Court had only briefly adverted to neutral principles as
an acceptable alternative to Watson and had not given it explicit ap-
proval.2 °8
With Serbian, then, the limitations of the Watson inquiry became
uncomfortably apparent. The stage was set for a direct discussion of
neutral principles' role as an alternative methodology.
H. Jones v. Wolf
In Jones v. Wof'° the Supreme Court explicitly approved neutral
principles as an alternative to Watson's total deference approach. In a
5-4 decision' 0 the Court affirmed its indication in Maryland& Virginia
206. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill. 2d 477,
504-05, 328 N.E.2d 268, 282-83 (1975). The Illinois court does not explicitly describe its method-
ology as neutral principles, but the Supreme Court is correct in recognizing that the inquiry into
church documents goes beyond Watson and seeks to interpret church documents without entan-
glement in religious matters. See 426 U.S. at 721.
207. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
208. In addition to the reference in Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449, the only other refer-
ence to neutral principles in a majority opinion is in Serbian. The Serbian majority uses the term
to describe the rejected methodology of the Illinois court as "purported neutral principles." 426
U.S. at 721. In a footnote, the majority states that "[n]o claim is made that the 'formal title'
doctrine by which church property disputes may be decided in civil courts is to be applied in this
case." Id at 723 n.15. The statement might be read as implicitly approving this version of neutral
principles. The lack of a reference to alternatives such as broader versions of neutral principles
may suggest that the Court did not recognize such versions.
209. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
210. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Rehn-
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Eldership that the first amendment permits states some latitude in se-
lecting a methodology for dispute resolution. The dissent, however, ar-
gued that departure from Watson as the sole methodology would result
both in unconstitutional intrusions into church affairs and in decisions
that did not fairly reflect the expectations of the parties.
2 1
The Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon, Georgia, decided by
majority vote to separate from the Presbyterian Church in the United
States and to join the Presbyterian Church in America. In the ensuing
conflict over church property,212 the Georgia courts cited Maryland &
Virginia Eldership and applied the neutral principles test.213 The deeds
conveyed the property to the local church, and no state statute or legal
or church document gave the eneral church an interest in the prop-
erty. The state supreme court therefore awarded ownership to the local
church as represented by the majority faction.214 The Supreme Court
essentially agreed with the Georgia court's method and remanded the
quist, and Stevens joined. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens had dissented in Serbian. The remain-
ing three had joined the Serbian majority. Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion in which
Justices Burger, Stewart, and White joined. Chief Justice Burger had concurred in the judgment
in Serbian, but had not written an opinion. Justices Stewart and Powell had joined the Serbian
majority. Justice White had joined in the views of the Serbian majority, but had written a brief
concurring opinion to emphasize that courts need not defer to church authorities in determining
whether or not a church is hierarchical and whether or not a faction is part of a church. No
generalization seems to explain the alignment of the justices in Jones.
211. 443 U.S. at 610-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
212. The minority faction had originally brought an action in federal court, but the complaint
failed for lack of jurisdiction. Lucas v. Hope, 515 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976).
213. Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E.2d 860 (1978).
214. The Georgia Supreme Court adopted a formal title approach in its decision on remand
after the United States Supreme Court decision in Presbyterian Church. Presbyterian Church v.
Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 255 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969). See text accompanying
notes 136-37 supra. In Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976), the court expanded its version of neutral principles to permit examination of statutes,
corporate charters, deeds, and church constitutions, provided no inquiry is made into religious
doctrine. For a synopsis, see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 599-601 (1979).
In Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 211, 243 S.E.2d 860, 863-64 (1978), the Georgia court noted that
all deeds named the trustees for the Vineville church as grantees, except in one instance in which
the deed named the local church, itself, as grantee. The local church's corporate charter and
Georgia statutes suggested nothing to the contrary. The court also found no language in the
denomination's book of order creating either an express or implied trust over local church prop-
erty, although some provisions dealt with the authority of denominational church courts over
matters of faith or internal church structure. The court contrasted these provisions with those in
Carnes. In Carnes the book of discipline of the United Methodist Church specifically gave the
denomination a trust over local church property.
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case for further proceedings.21 5
The Supreme Court accepted the neutral principles approach, but
held that any of various approaches is permissible.21 6 According to the
Court, the Constitution requires only that the method not resolve dis-
putes on the basis of religious doctrine or practice and that it defer to
the resolution of such issues by the hierarchical church's highest au-
thority. The Court, however, failed to suggest the nature of approaches
other than Watson or neutral principles; instead it emphasized the ad-
vantages of neutral principles. According to the Court, the advantages
lie in the use of secular concepts of trust and property law, which are
familiar to civil lawyers and which do not implicate forbidden religious
questions.21 7 The Court also argued that reliance on the private law
system supplies flexibility in ordering property arrangements that re-
flect the intentions of the parties. The Court recognized that occasion-
ally a neutral principles inquiry might lead a court to a document
provision involving doctrinal controversy. The Court would then defer
to church authority to resolve the religious issue.218 As the Court
noted, however, this occasional problem in application will gradually
disappear as churches restructure property relationships to avoid de-
pendence on ecclesiastical questions in resolving disputes.2 19
Although the Court reaffirmed the acceptability of Watson defer-
ence, it rejected the dissent's argument 220 that only such complete def-
erence is constitutional. The majority countered that compulsory
deference, unlike neutral principles, requires a review of church polity
or doctrine to determine where authority lies within the church as well
as whether the church has made a determination and what that deter-
uination is. According to the Court, then, a neutral principles exami-
nation of religious documents is no more unconstitutional than
investigatory excursions under Watson .221 The Court clearly implied
215. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, on remand, Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 260 S.E.2d 84 (1979),
cert. denied, Jones v. Wolf, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980).
216. "Indeed, 'a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property
disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy
of worship or the tenets of faith.'" Id at 602 (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original)).
217. Id at 603.
218. Id at 604.
219. Id
220. Id at 610-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
221. Id at 605-06.
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that these matters involve no issue of doctrinal controversy; thus, exam-
ination of church polity does not necessarily result in unconstitutional
entanglement.222 As in the past, the Court identified specific types of
inquiries as constitutionally permissible or impermissible rather than
formulate an analytical rule. Even this approach, however, fails to fur-
nish precision: The Court limited the Watson method by banning any
"searching inquiry" to determine the form of church governance.223
The Jones Court also dealt with a critical aspect of the neutral princi-
ples approach-when a court finds that property belongs to the local
congregation and the local congregation has divided, which faction
constitutes the church and possesses the property? The Georgia court
had awarded the property to the majority faction without explana-
tion.224 The Court therefore remanded the case for an articulated reso-
lution of the issue, but it also offered guidance.
The Court asserted the constitutionality of a presumptive rule of ma-
jority representation rebuttable "upon a showing that the identity of
the local church is to be determined by some other means." '225 In the
presumption's favor, the Court noted that religious societies generally
employ majority rule in their governance and that, as a general rule,
courts can identify the majority faction without confronting questions
of doctrine or polity.226 The presumption, however, must be rebuttable
lest it impair free exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in religious
controversy. The Court also held that a state may employ other meth-
ods of identifying the true local church. For example, it may rule that
the identity of the local church is to be determined according to the
laws and regulations of the hierarchical church.227 Under this rule, the
state court would have to defer to the determination of the Augusta-
Macon Presbytery.228
222. Id
223. Id at 605.
224. Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 212, 243 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1978). The court merely reported
that the trial court concluded that legal title was vested in the local congregation represented by
the majority faction.
225. 443 U.S. at 607.
226. Id As authority for the general use of majority rule in religious societies, the Court relies
on Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872). Bouldin, however, deals with a congrega-
tional church; Jones deals with the local church that was part of a hierarchical church and that
voted to join another hierarchical church, the Presbyterian Church in America. 443 U.S. at 598.
227. 443 U.S. at 608-09.
228. The Court noted that Georgia statutes might require that decisions about church property
ownership be made according to the terms of church government and, in the case of a hierarchical
[Vol. 59:1
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Jones v. Wolf is a 5-4 decision. The precarious balance requires
thoughtful consideration of the dissent's position. Writing for the dis-
senters,229 Justice Powell argued that neutral principles unconstitution-
ally increases judicial involvement in church controversies. According
to Justice Powell, the rule acts as a restrictive rule of evidence in that it
limits courts to examining language written in secular legal property
terms and forbids consideration of other language that might speak to
the allocation of authority within the church polity.230 The dissent ar-
gued that refusal to consider such evidence can permit courts to reverse
the decisions of church authorities and thus unconstitutionally interfere
with the resolution of religious disputes.23'
The dissent further faulted the majority's treatment of the factional-
ized local congregation.23 2 It argued that a state court could create a
presumption favoring majority rule and require the church to have vot-
ing rules related explicitly to property disputes to overcome the pre-
sumption. Because this approach might overrule an intrachurch
decision based on more general rules, the approach interferes with first
amendment rights.
The dissent, therefore, would require courts to abide by the Watson
method because only complete deferral avoids interference with reli-
gious governance and protects the rights of church members who have
church, according to the laws of the denomination. Id at 608-09 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-
5507, 22-5508 (1980)). According to the Court, the provisions of the Presbyterian Church book of
order concerning the identity of the true congregation were so pervaded with issues of church
doctrine and policy that if the statutes applied, the Georgia court would have to defer to the
determination of the denomination's authorities on the application of the provisions. 443 U.S. at
608-09. On remand, the Georgia court stated that the provisions of the book of order dealt with
identifying the local congregation in matters of doctrinal disputes but not in determining property
rights. Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 389, 260 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080
(1980).
229. 443 U.S. at 610-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
230. Id at 612-13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
231. The neutral-principles approach appears to assume that the requirements of the
Constitution will be satisfied if civil courts are forbidden to consider certain types of
evidence. The First Amendment's Religion Clauses, however, are meant to protect
churches and their members from civil law interference, not to protect the courts from
having to decide difficult evidentiary questions. Thus the evidentiary rules to be applied
in cases involving intrachurch disputes over church property should be fashioned to
avoid interference with the resolution of the dispute within the accepted church govern-
ment. The neutral-principles approach consists instead of a rule of evidence that ensures
that in some cases the courts will impose a form of church government and a doctrinal
resolution at odds with that reached by the church's own authority.
Id at 613-14 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232. Id at 614-16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Washington University Open Scholarship
48 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
233submitted to that governance.
The Jones majority took a broader view of what the Constitution
permits the states to do to resolve church property disputes. Although
the Court did not limit the states to two possible methodologies, it gave
its approval to two. According to Jones, states can assume either that
church members submit to hierarchical authority in property matters or
that statements in secular terminology appearing in civil and internal
church documents are accurate in their descriptions of property owner-
ship. Although the Court took care in approving only methods that
limited interference in ecclesiastical and doctrinal affairs, it approved
two methods that could yield very different results when applied to the
same dispute.234 Perhaps, then, the Court was uncertain whether the
judiciary could attain accuracy in church property cases. The dissent,
however, avoided the question of accuracy. Because it argued that neu-
tral principles is unconstitutionally intrusive the dissent would limit
courts to one methodology and one possible result.
I. Conclusion
At the root of these cases is the difficult task of resolving a property
dispute without the excessive entanglement that comes from deciding
the underlying religious controversy. Before Kedroff, the limits ofjudi-
cial competence and the concerns fostered by the first amendment
called for the distinction between issues of property and issues of doc-
trine; since Kedroff, the Constitution has mandated it. The distinction
is born of pragmatism-the need of an orderly society to settle property
disputes without doing violence to the Constitution. Avoidance of the
essential religious controversy, however, has severely challenged courts
to develop a constitutionally permissible methodology that also deals
fairly with the parties' expectations. The Supreme Court answered the
challenge by approving methods that apparently steer clear of religious
issues but still reflect arguably valid assumptions about the expecta-
tions of the church and its members.
The Watson Court described the relationships within a church as es-
233. Id at 617-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
234. Jones v. Wolf offers a typical illustration. The dissenting justices, applying the W'tson
method, would have deferred to the decision of the regional Presbytery and ordered a judgment
for the loyalist minority faction. Id at 620-21 (Powell, J., dissenting). On remand, the Georgia
court applied neutral principles and found for the majority faction. Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388,
390, 260 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980).
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sentially the same as those within a secular voluntary association. By
portraying the relationships in terms of a traditional legal model, the
Court asserted the secular nature of the inquiry and thus legitimized
judicial intervention in church affairs. Although the solution offered
some insights and a not unreasonable approach to the problem, it failed
to furnish a perfectly suitable answer.235
Concern about judicial intrusion into the religious domain limited
the evidence that a civil court could consider in resolving the religious
235. The cases recognize churches as voluntary associations, and, at least after Kedroff, they
recognize that churches must have a law of religious associations, as opposed to a law of private
associations, because of the constitutional concern for church autonomy. The cases have fre-
quently used the language of contract and trust law perhaps because they reflect an undeveloped
notion of how groups and members interrelate and because they are building blocks for the law of
associations.
Although an element of member submission to church authority is certainly present, the agree-
ment's contours are rarely delineated and are frequently tacit. In some churches, particularly
those accepting infant members, a member may formally agree to submission and membership.
Members unschooled in ecclesiastical affairs may likely lack a full understanding of their commit-
ment. Rules for contract remedies do not closely apply. The remedy in a church property dispute
is an all or nothing victory or defeat for the respective factions. The contract theory fails to ex-
plain the extreme deference that the courts pay to the interpretation of rules by the organization as
opposed to the disputing member. Moreover, the Constitution precludes, as evidence, critical in-
formation necessary to confidently ascertain intent or expectations. See Chafee, supra note 4, at
1001-07; Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1001-02. For analyses favorable to contract
theory, see C. ZOLLMAN, supra note 3, at 223-26; Bernard, Churches, Members, and the Role of
Courts.- Towarda Contractual.4nalysis, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 545, 558 (1976) (but admitting that
"the contract framework does not presume to realistically reflect an individual's relation to his
church").
The trust concept is also artificial. As early as Watson, the Court was unwilling to find a trust
within a hierarchical church unless the trust was express. Although a charitable institution has
responsibilities in using its assets, the trust notion does not necessarily describe its relationship to
property. For example, Professor Scott states:
The truth is that it cannot be stated dogmatically either that a charitable corporation is
or that it is not a trustee .... Thus where property is left by will to a charitable corpo-
ration, whether it may be used for the general purposes of the corporation or whether the
devise or bequest is subject to restrictions as to its use, and the property is conveyed by
the executor to the corporation, the corporation is not thereafter bound to account as if it
were a testamentary trustee.
4 A.W. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.1, at 2778 (3d ed. 1967).
As Professor Chafee recognized, the relationship between members and a voluntary association
conforms to its own model There is a law of voluntary associations, which views the member-
church relationship as analogous to the relation between a shareholder and a corporation or a
partner and the partnership. Chafee, supra note 4, at 1007-08. The first amendment, however,
requires that special rules apply to the church lest secular intrusion violate the Constitution. Al-
though laws governing church disputes have strong kinship with the law of voluntary associations,
they should recognize their unique status as church law. See Giannella, supra note 9, at 535-37.
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society's internal dispute.2 36 The Supreme Court, therefore, rendered
the proscribed evidence unnecessary by assuming that church members
submitted entirely to church authority on all religious matters. The end
result was virtually complete internal autonomy. The assumption thus
permitted the Court to treat churches like private associations, but
without the bother of sifting through the evidence that might confirm
or reject such extreme autonomy. The assumption thus twisted the
methodology.
From at least the time of the Court's decision in Gonzalez to Serbian,
the Court assumed that fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness set outer lim-
its on the assumed submission of church members. When Serbian dis-
posed of the check on arbitrariness and cast doubt on review for fraud
or collusion, the immunity of church authority grew even stronger.
Neutral principles challenged this autonomy by offering a methodology
based on traditional property law. It has required a court to assume
that formal legal title, as modified or changed by secular provisions in
various documents, reflects the expectations of the parties. The ban on
religious intrusion, however, modifies the traditional civil law method-
ology by excluding evidence that could illuminate the parties' inten-
tions and expectations. The methodology, thus, is rigid. It offers
virtually no flexibility for a court that wishes to employ evidence and
law to fashion a just result and avoid a harsh one.
Both Watson deference and neutral principles derive from tradi-
tional methods for dispute resolution. Perhaps the traditional roots en-
hance their legitimacy. The methods, however, have been stylized to
accommodate the special nature of church disputes. Both omit consti-
tutionally offensive aspects of the inquiry and use assumptions about
expectations to preserve the methodologies' integrity. Even with the
assumptions in place, however, each methodology cannot function
without sometimes considering forbidden information. A property
deed, for example, may incorporate religious concepts or the identity of
236. Courts are also generally reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of private groups.
The reluctance stems from a pluralistic desire to preserve autonomy and diversity, the complexity
and burdensomeness of inquiries into organizational rules, the resentment that judicial intrusion
can produce and its limited prospects for success, and the fundamental role of free association in a
system that relies on freedom of expression and assembly. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-13, at
881-82. The immediate practical burdens of adjudicating a church dispute can be overwhelming.
In Serbian, for example, the trial involved over 100 witnesses, nearly 600 multipage exhibits, over
1200 pages of transcript, and over 100 days of courtroom time. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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hierarchical authority may prove elusive without a searching look at
religious documents. In these cases, the court must abandon its now
illicit approach and adopt a different methodology.
The Supreme Court cases thus disclose broad first amendment im-
munity for churches.237 The fear of interfering with church autonomy
has banned civil interpretation of doctrine, polity, and practice. The
accepted methodologies for judicial resolution, however, evoke ques-
tions about first amendment entanglement and about the parties' ex-
pectations. The next section of this Article evaluates complete
deference and neutral principles on these grounds.
II. WATSON AND NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Satisfying the First Amendment
In the post-Kedroff cases the first amendment has become the pri-
mary standard for evaluating judicial decisions in church property dis-
putes. Although the religion clauses determine the validity of the court
decision, they do not directly favor either the historically established
church or the dissenters. Instead, they guarantee religious freedom to
both factions. To satisfy the constitutional requirement, then, a judicial
test must favor neither side and must not permit the court to make
determinations on doctrine or polity.238 The test, moreover, must not
create too great a hazard of unconstitutional behavior. It must avoid
the threat of excessive entanglement as well as excessive entanglement
itself. The approved tests, Watson and neutral principles, purport to
satisfy the constitutional standard. Although each claims to find for a
given faction lest it curtail that faction's religious rights,23 9 neither suc-
cessfully deals with the first amendment's mandates.
Inadequacies in the Supreme Court's method of constitutional analy-
sis partially account for the Court's determination that the existing tests
are valid. The Court views first amendment precepts as absolutes in
church property disputes as it does in other areas.240 It therefore deter-
237. On judicial concern for the institutional stability of churches, see Casad, supra note 3, at
64-65.
238. See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
239. The free exercise clause approves or rejects tests and does not prescribe them. Any test
makes a choice among competing claims to religious freedom. Cf. Kauper, supra note 3, at 376-77
(the Presbyterian Church Court made such a choice, and even the departure-from-doctrine stan-
dard sought to protect the expectations of the church's benefactors).
240. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
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mines whether or not a judicial test violates the absolute constitutional
mandate of free exercise but fails to articulate the policy considerations
that underlie the determination. Analyses of complete deference, neu-
tral principles, and their variations, then, are conclusionary and do not
directly grapple with the internal constitutional analysis. An articula-
tion of the analysis might assist in evaluating the merits of the two ac-
cepted tests. An articulation might also offer insights in close cases
over specific aspects of the tests-for example, the continued viability
of the remaining Gonzalez qualification of Watson.241
Instead of openly relying on such an analysis, however, the Court
has declared constitutionally impermissible certain inquiries that it
finds in clear violation of the Constitution-for example, the departure-
from-doctrine test 24 2 -or inquiries that it views as unconstitutional be-
cause of a great risk of excessive entanglement-for example, an in-
quiry into a church tribunal's jurisdiction.243 Given the speculative
nature of these determinations, the lack of an analytical approach is
understandable. Nonetheless, the existing approach sometimes forbids
a full evaluation by banning the examination of an issue that would not
endanger first amendment rights in the specific case. For example, Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent in Serbian raises the possibility of a church
tribunal that claims to act authoritatively despite the lack of a quorum;
he argues that the Serbian majority would forbid an inquiry into such
arbitrariness.'" Perhaps in such a clear cut case, a judicial inquiry
would not violate the religion clauses.2 45 (Other facts in the case, of
course, might make the matter less clear cut.) The current approach
also permits inquiries in areas in which the risk of constitutional viola-
tion is high in a specific case. For example, a neutral principles exami-
nation of church documents may create a high probability of intrusion
241. The Court continues to leave open the question whether the civil judiciary can review an
authoritative church decision for fraud or collusion. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 n.8
(1979).
242. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969).
243. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
713-14 (1976) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34 (1872)).
244. Id at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
245. The difference between forbidden and permissible governmental intrusion into a re-
ligious organization to protect individual members from fraud and oppression must ulti-
mately be a difference of degree-but the difference of degree between the examples
Justice Rehnquist offered in dissent and the facts of the Serbian Orthodox case seem
wide enough to constitute differences in kind.
L. TrtiB, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 880.
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into church affairs that are immune from judicial review.246 The bulk
of this section discusses the ways in which the Supreme Court has ig-
nored dangers inherent in the methodologies it has approved. The lack
of an articulated analysis also creates a related problem of evaluation.
Because the constitutional dangers in Watson and neutral principles
are so apparent, the inadequacy of the analysis renders impossible a
persuasive distinction between the accepted methodologies and their
unacceptable variants. The section also addresses this concern.
I. The Risk of Illicit Inquiry
Both Watson and neutral principles risk intrusion into constitution-
ally forbidden areas. The risk, moreover, may be as great as that posed
by inquiries that the Court has rejected.
Because the Watson method seeks the identity of the ultimate church
authority, it deals with a matter at the core of ecclesiastical affairs. The
Jones majority banned too searching an inquiry in making the identifi-
cation.247 Nonetheless, the risk of an illicit inquiry looms large because
the Watson method permits recourse to church documents and prac-
tices and raises the possibility of judicial misinterpretation.
Compare the ban on determining whether or not an authoritative
church body enjoys jurisdiction over a certain matter, such as church
property ownership. A court sometimes might be able to define accu-
rately the allocation of internal church authority, but the cases since
Watson strictly forbid the inquiry.248 According to the Court, the fre-
quent necessity of construing ambiguous religious law and usage cre-
ates an unacceptable risk.249 The same risk, however, seems to attach
to attempts under Watson to identify the highest ecclesiastical deci-
sionmaker2 5 ° Both inquiries are of a related nature, and both require
246. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 612-13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
247. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605.
248. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
713-14 (1976).
249. Id
250. [In some cases] the locus of control would be ambiguous, and "[a] careful examina-
tion of the constitutions of the general and local church, as well as other relevant docu-
ments, [would) be necessary to ascertain the form of governance adopted by the
members of the religious association." [quoting Powell, J., dissenting, at 619-20]. In such
cases, the suggested rule would appear to require "a searching and therefore impermissi-
ble inquiry into church polity" [quoting Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the
United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723].
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979).
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recourse to the same sorts of documents and practices.
The only difference is that in a jurisdictional dispute, the court pre-
sumably has already identified the tribunals that claim jurisdiction-
for example, the respective tribunals of a local church and a denomina-
tion or the competing tribunals of a schismatic hierarchy. Arguably a
court minimizes the risk of unconstitutional intrusion in solving the ju-
risdictional issue by deferring to the decision of a church authority.25'
Two considerations, however, suggest caution. First, the case's primary
controversy may focus on which of two tribunals has correctly asserted
authority; a schism, as in Serbian,252 and arguably a Bouldin-style con-
gregational split 253 offer illustrations. Second, the identification of
church authority is frequently intertwined with the question ofjurisdic-
tion; it is therefore difficult to argue that one finding precedes the other.
An illustrative case is Presbyterian Church in which the local church
claimed a congregational polity and the general church claimed a hier-
archical polity.254 In any case, no evidence suggests that a Watson
search for church authority is more risk free than the ascertainment of
jurisdiction.
One response to this argument might be that if the Watson inquiry is
permissible, then the jurisdictional inquiry should also be permissible.
This proposal would shave the margin of constitutional error that the
current rule purports to maintain. It would also require substantial re-
thinking of constitutional learning about church and state. The impor-
tant point, however, is that the approved Watson method contains
inherent constitutional problems that courts have ignored. As a result,
no bright line separates inquiries that create too great a hazard of un-
251. If the civil courts are to inquire into all these [jurisdictional] matters, the whole sub-
ject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental
organization of every religious denomination may, and must, be examined with minute-
ness and care, for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the
validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1872) (quoted in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976)).
252. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976). See, e.g., Draskovich v. Pasalich, 151 Ind. App. 397, 280 N.E.2d 69 (1972), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973); Macedono-Bulgarian Orthodox Church "St. Clement Ohridski" v. Macedo-
nian Patriotic Org. "Fatherland," 27 Mich. App. 713, 184 N.W.2d 233 (1970).
253. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872). See also Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass.
487 (1820).
254. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969). See also 1977 UTAH L. REv. 138, 144 (problem arising when an autonomous
church affiliates with a hierarchical church).
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constitutional conduct and inquiries that do not. The distinction there-
fore seems unsuitably artificial.
The neutral principles method suffers from a similar constitutional
weakness. Just as a Watson court must resort to ecclesiastical docu-
ments, a neutral principles court must also examine documents and risk
illicit inquiry, particularly if it goes beyond bare legal title. For exam-
ple, suppose that a local church of a Christian denomination decides to
disaffiliate and become interdenominational. 25 5 The denomination's
book of order provides: "Whenever a particular church has become
extinct by reason of dispersal of its members, the abandonment of its
work, or other cause, such property as it may have may be sold or dis-
posed of as the denomination may direct in conformity with the consti-
tution of the denomination." The local church's articles of
incorporation provide that its purpose is "the establishment of one or
more places of worship and the dissemination of Christian doctrine."
The denomination might concede that the local church continues to
disseminate Christian doctrine, but argue that the word "work," as
used in the book of order, refers to the work of the denomination.
Whether or not a court should construe the controverted word or
defer to the interpretation of the denomination is a close question. Be-
cause no rule clearly defines the limits of intrusion, risky inquiries and
unwitting entanglements can plague a court that seeks to separate the
secular wheat from the religious chaff. In the example, I would argue
for deference, because the work of a local church depends on the de-
nomination's definition of its religious mission. In the alternative, I
would argue that "work," in the context of the book of order, means
the work of the denomination and does not refer to the general lan-
guage in the articles of incorporation.256
In answering the criticism that neutral principles risks illicit inquiry,
the Jones Court would argue that such difficulties are "occasional
problems in application" 257 while Watson's problem is central to the
255. The following illustration is loosely based upon an issue in Presbytery of Riverside v.
Community Church of Palm Springs, 89 Cal. App. 3d 910, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 974 (1979).
256. In the case upon which the illustration is based, the court relied on the definition of
"work" furnished by the articles of incorporation and held that the local church still carried on
that work despite its withdrawal from the denomination, the United Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America. Therefore, the court held, the church had not become extinct under the
terms of the denomination's book of order. Id at 930, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
257. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
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method. But to argue that in practice either complete deference or neu-
tral principles offers less risk of interpretative error than the other re-
quires reliance on unacceptably speculative grounds.
2. Imposing a Secular Standard
Both methods raise a more fundamental first amendment problem.
They sometimes impose a secularly created test on a church contro-
versy.
Suppose a church fails to provide for property allocation in case of a
division. Under the Watson method, a court would identify the body
recognized as decisionmaker by all parties before the dispute.258 This
reliance on history, albeit recent history, freezes church development at
a stage prior to a fundamental change in the parties' relationship. The
continuing validity of the prior arrangement is a judicial assumption
that a process with legitimacy in normal times retains legitimacy in ab-
normal times. In a church split, however, one faction usually asserts
the illegitimacy of the other faction's procedures or related conduct.
The judicial assumption certainly is convenient; without it, a court
might be hard pressed to identify an authoritative decisionmaker. A
church division frequently stems from substantial disagreement over
religious issues or issues with a religious element. According to the
courts,2 59 these matters should be the subject of ecclesiastical adjudica-
tion rather than civil adjudication; however, the factions differ in their
recognition of the appropriate church authority. This reality severely
limits a civil court from constitutionally allocating church authority af-
ter a serious internal dispute has arisen.
Whether or not this difficulty rises to a judicially cognizable violation
of the first amendment is debatable, because the constitutional test is
imprecise. Arguably, the court's interpretation of the continuing valid-
ity of the church's prior arrangement is the sort of interpretation that
courts typically make, and the inevitable risk of misinterpretation ac-
companies it. This risk, however, raises the constitutional issue. If the
risk of imposing a judicially devised solution is too great, the hazard of
258. See Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 3,
at 1162-64 (advocating the living-relationship test to determine whether church is subject to hier-
archical authority); cf. State ex rel Morrow v. Hill, 51 Ohio St. 2d 74, 364 N.E.2d 1156 (1977)
(applying living-relationship test in dispute over authentic trustees and minister).
259. E.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
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unwarranted judicial intrusion becomes unacceptable. 260  Under the
same rationale, judicial review of a church tribunal's jurisdiction2 6' and
of its conformity with its own procedures262 creates an unacceptable
risk. Because the line between acceptable and unacceptable risk is not
a bright one and a strong policy favors avoiding risk, a judicially cogni-
zable violation of the Constitution is likely present. In any case, the
shortcomings of the Watson methodology here provoke doubts about
the advisability of its continued use.
The Watson approach, moreover, may subtly favor the faction in
command of the church's adjudicatory mechanism. Because a Watson
court relies on a church's internal determinations, members also have
limited motivation to civilly litigate to avoid the ruling of the church
mechanism. The lack of close judicial review makes members less
likely to reject or torture the meaning of church rules in hopes that a
civil court will accept the favorable interpretation if the adjudicating
church body rejects it.
Although conflict of interest is a secular concept, the potential parti-
sanship of the decisionmaker in a church dispute also justifies discom-
fort.2 63 Even if the conflict creates no judicially cognizable first
amendment issue, the Watson rule still threatens to tilt the scales
against the dissidents.
The Jones dissent hinted at solicitude for preserving and advancing
existing church institutions. 2 " In critiquing neutral principles, it noted
the burdens that would beset a church trying to restate its property rela-
tionships in the terminology of the civil law. The dissent warned that
requiring the restatement in legal terms might inhibit the formation of
churches by forcing organizers to confront issues that might never arise.
260. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
261. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
713-14; text accompanying notes 53, 54, 189 supra.
262. 426 U.S. at 713-15.
263. "It is perfectly patent that the most important ecclesiastical trials, like trials for impeach-
ment of civil officers, are sometimes characterized by a great want of justice and fairness and
deeply imbued with a spirit of bitterness and malevolence." C. ZOLLMAN, supra note 3, at 206.
"[A]n ecclesiastical court.. . is proverbially influenced more by prejudice and passion than any
other species ofjudicial tribunal." 10 Am. L. REG. (19 U. PA. L. RFv.) 308, 309-10 (1871) (Red-
field, 1.). Despite the great possibility of bias in the tribunal of a private association, it receives
more tolerance there than it would in a trial court. Courts generally require a clear showing of
prejudice before they will invoke bias to upset an association's action. See Developments in the
Law, supra note 4, at 1034-35.
264. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 613-14 n.2 (1979).
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It also warned that the restatement of polity and property arrangements
could precipitate church property disputes. The dissent thus implied
that Watson better promotes church growth and unity, because it
avoids creating circumstances that motivate church members to seek
full information about the nature of their affiliation.
The dissent's concern, however, is inappropriate. Members who ex-
ercise their rights to join a church or continue their affiliation should do
so based on a full knowledge of the implications. Watson's subtle
favoring of the faction in command of church machinery, its indiffer-
ence to potential conflict of interest, and the Jones dissent's preference
for institutional stability over knowledgeable exercise of religious rights
may not constitute judicially cognizable first amendment violations.
They do, however, impair the underlying spirit of free exercise and
nonestablishment.
Just as Watson raises a constitutional problem when it imposes on a
church a dispute settlement mechanism that the church devised prior to
division, neutral principles also raises a constitutional problem. Like
Watson, it imposes a state created rule that may sometimes interfere
with church polity and doctrine. Even if a neutral principles court ad-
vertently avoids ambiguities and religious concepts, it assumes that
nonreligious language is sufficient evidence of religious determinations
about property. The bare legal title doctrine is most offensive from this
viewpoint. The court lacks any indication that the church's attorneys
were doing any more than placing legal title in a judicially cognizable
and conveniently identifiable entity, individual, or group of individu-
als.
A more expansive version of neutral principles that also examines
internal church documents does not promise much greater accuracy. In
seeking specific language governing property ownership, the court as-
sumes that lack of such language requires resort to bare legal title or to
state-manufactured presumptions about property control. Even if spe-
cific language is lacking, however, the church may have made provi-
sion for property control. The determinative language may lie
elsewhere; perhaps in a provision infected with religious concepts, per-
haps in words identifying a tribunal as the ultimate authority in church
affairs, or perhaps in a provision asserting local church affiliation with
the denomination. To the ecclesiastical eye, such language may clearly
imply where property control lies. In these cases, neutral principles
would impose an alien scheme of doctrine and polity. By discarding
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the church's internal resolution or method of resolution, it imposes a
form of governance and curtails the church's free exercise rights. This
is the argument of the Jones dissenters. 65 The Jones majority empha-
sized the ease with which a church can conform its legal documents
and secular provisions in church documents to authentic church pol-
ity.266 The ease of achieving conformity, however, does not guarantee
conformity.
The possible divergence between a neutral principles determination
and the church's actual property arrangements is well illustrated by the
Jones discussion on identifying the local faction that is entitled to the
property.267 The Vineville Presbyterian Church had developed no
mechanism for resolving the issue, most likely because it traditionally
viewed itself as part of a hierarchical church. The Supreme Court ap-
proved Georgia's apparent adoption of a presumption of majority
rule.268 The Court noted that majority rule is generally employed in
the governance of religious societies (citing Bouldin,269 which dealt
with a congregational church), that a majority is easily identifiable, and
that a presumption of majority rule can easily be overcome by evidence
to the contrary. The traditional Presbyterian church structure at issue
in Jones, however, furnished no basis for a presumption resting on the
conduct of congregational churches,2  and the lack of a church-
devised mechanism for resolving disputes at the local level meant that
the presumption would likely prevail, as it ultimately did.
Although presumptions in civil cases enjoy wide latitude in claiming
that a rational connection underlies the presumption,27 perhaps the
validity of such presumptions should require closer examination when
first amendment rights are at issue. In the Jones case a rational connec-
tion is lacking. Even if the presumption's questionable basis (reliance
on the common structure of a congregational church) was adequate to
pass judicial muster,272 the damage to the spirit of the first amendment
265. Id at 613.
266. Id at 603-04.
267. Id at 606-10.
268. See note 228 supra.
269. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
270. In a congregational church, however, elders, as opposed to the general membership, may
have full charge of management and control over church affairs. E.g., Murrell v. Bentley, 39
Tenn. App. 563, 286 S.W.2d 359 (1954). The elders, of course, may be subject to removal by the
membership. Eg., Bentley v. Shanks, 48 Tenn. App. 512, 348 S.W.2d 900 (1960).
271. See C. McCoRMicK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 344, at 818 (2d ed. E. Cleary gen. ed. 1972).
272. Even if the Court had assumed that the presumption rested on typical governance in
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should still cause concern; the court is interfering with the church's
right to exercise its autonomy.
273
As Jones illustrates, neutral principles may efficiently resolve ambi-
secular organizations or on general democratic principles, the objection would remain. Churches
may not share the same values as other institutions in society. See Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1381, 1385 (1967) (criticizing judicial approval of orthodox values rather than balancing
the imposition of those values against nonconforming values based on religious belief). The au-
thor states: "[There is] judicial acquiescence in the sometimes unpalatable fact that democratic
government acts to reinforce the generally accepted values of a given society and not merely the
fundamental ones which relate to its political structure." Id
Majority rule is not an inherent principle in religious organizations. Even with respect to elec-
tions within the church hierarchy, Roman Catholic Church officials and scholars did not develop
it until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Majority rule came as an alternative to unanimity and
to giving greater weight to the votes of electors with greater qualifications and merits. Approval of
the principle required developing the notion of qualified and unqualified candidates (as an alter-
native to relying on the respective qualifications of the electors), the delegation of election to
another person or committee, the notion of a corporate body acting through a majority, and confi-
dence in the vote of the greater number of electors over the fewer number of electors. See McCal-
lin, The Development of a Legal Theory of Majority Rule in Elections, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1971).
The various alternatives to majority rule cannot be dismissed out of hand as wrong or highly
unlikely for a church to adopt.
273. According to current scholarly learning, a civil presumption requires no rational connec-
tion between fact proved and fact presumed; social policy and convenience can also serve as a
presumption's basis. See Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidencefor United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 215-
17 (1969); note 272 supra. But see 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 5129, at 626-37 (1977).
The Supreme Court cases do not permit absolute certainty for these assertions. Western & Atl.
R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929), invalidated a Georgia statute for want of a rational
connection between the fact proved and fact presumed when the presumption shifted the burden
of persuasion. Commentators have criticized the holding as inconsistent with prior case law (Mo-
bile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910)) and implicitly inconsistent with Dick v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959), which employed without challenge a common-law
rule shifting to the defending insurance company in an accidental death case the burden of per-
suading the court that the death of the insured was due to suicide. Commentators therefore argue
that Henderson lacks vitality. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 271, § 344, at 819; Advisory
Committee, supra, at 216-17.
As recently as 1958, however, the Court approvingly cited Henderson. Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 524 (1958). In Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584-85 n.9 (1976), the Court upheld the
legislative allocation of a burden of persuasion in another context and stated that it was not basing
its decision on Henderson and that it was not examining whether it would today decide Henderson
as it had. The Court thus has not explicitly overruled Henderson. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court upheld various presumptions under the Coal Mining
Health and Safety Act of 1969. The Court stated that the test for constitutionality of presumptions
arising in civil statutes involving matters of economic regulation is that there be "some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one
fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate." 428
U.S. at 28 (quoting Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43). The Court found that the presumptions passed
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guities in church doctrine and practice, but the standard it employs
may bear no relationship to ecclesiastical reality. Because of the lim-
ited evidence upon which it relies, the method may resort to inappro-
priate criteria and effectively override the free exercise rights of the
parties.
3. The Underling Pragmatic Analysis
The preceding discussion demonstrates that both Watson and neutral
principles risk impermissible intrusion into church affairs. Neither of-
fers a well defined, restrictive rule on evidence or inquiry that promises
a comfortable margin of error to reduce the danger of unconstitutional
methodology. Although each claims not to interfere with free exercise,
each may substitute a secular standard for a religious standard. Wat-
son uses a questionable historical method, and neutral principles relies
on a restricted evidence "legal" method. Society does not expect courts
always to ascertain a dispute's authentic solution. Rather, courts
should employ a process that maximizes the possibility of achieving
that goal or a close approximation within constitutional and statutory
limitations. In church property dispute cases, however, the method's
deficiencies suggest a high risk of poor approximations and constitu-
tionally questionable conduct. The analysis certainly does not indicate
the superiority of one method over the other.
Many of the constitutional concerns raised here have yet to receive
the test. Given the lack of further discussion, it might be unfair to assume that the Court rejected
social policy and convenience as legitimate, independent grounds for civil presumptions.
Despite their rejection of Henderson, however, the commentators suggest that the Constitution
imposes some outer limit on the creation of presumptions in civil cases. C. McCORMICK, supra
note 271, § 344, at 818; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 301[01], at 301-
26 to -27 (1979). The Weinstein treatise states: "In particularly sensitive, constitutionally guaran-
teed areas, the effect of a presumption may unconstitutionally interfere with an 'interest of tran-
scending value,' such as freedom of speech." Id (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 513, and citing New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964)). Both cases deal with free speech.
Speiser involved a shift in the burden of persuasion but not by use of a presumption. The New
York Times Court constitutionally limited the state's power to award damages for libel in an
action by a public official against critics of the official's conduct and stated: "While Alabama law
apparently requires proof of actual malice for an award of punitive damages, where general dam-
ages are concerned malice is 'presumed.' Such a presumption is inconsistent with the federal
rule." 376 U.S. at 283-84 (citation omitted). Thus, if a court permits a presumption in a matter
touching on free exercise and purports to justify it with a rational connection argument, the ra-
tional connection should have some substance. The Jones Court may have recognized some of the
underlying concern in assuming that the majority rule was rebuttable and that any method of
overcoming the presumption could "not impair free-exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in
matters of religious controversy." 443 U.S. at 607-08.
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acknowledgement by the courts. Concerns about the Watson test re-
main particularly unrecognized; they are, however, real ones. The judi-
cial inattention itself suggests insights into both the existing formal
analysis and the unarticulated constitutional analysis.
No convincing argument exists that the inquiries permitted and the
inquiries prohibited differ substantially in the constitutional risk that
they respectively pose. To avoid the constitutional difficulties, the
methodologies work on the assumption that the judicial inquiry lacks a
religious dimension. As demonstrated, however, the assumption proves
false.
The distinction between permissible and impermissible inquiries is
based on pragmatism. The state has a legitimate interest in preserving
an orderly society and persuading its members that the rule of law
prevails. A court, therefore, may act to insure that title and ownership
of land are settled. The judicial process offers a nonviolent way to give
disputes a final disposition and to identify the property owner; it gives
security to the property owner, enhances free alienability of property,
and permits an injured party to seek a responsible owner.274
In the pursuit of social order, the reasons for limited judicial review
of internal church disputes are particularly persuasive. In this setting,
the threat of violent challenge to the civil peace seems slight, although
not absent,275 and the concrete danger of impairing religious rights out-
weighs the very general goal of an orderly society. Moreover, cur-
tailing religious freedom in a society that reveres it impairs societal
legitimacy.
Given the need for some judicial review, courts require a methodol-
ogy so they can render legally consistent determinations. The religious
basis of the conflicts defies judicial efforts to disregard it. Constitution-
ally questionable intrusions therefore seem unavoidable for a method-
274. See Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes, supra note 3, at 1130.
275. E.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 685 (1872) (elders aligned with minority
faction refused to permit congregation's majority to use church premises even after receiving court
order, court therefore ordered marshall to take control of church); Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30,
32-33, 222 S.E.2d 322, 324, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976) (sheriff was called to remove district
superintendent from the church); Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Baltimore, 39 Md.
405, 416, 386 A.2d 357, 363 (Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (police summoned by church members to re-
quest denominational authorities to leave); Murrell v. Bentley, 39 Tenn. App. 563, 570-71, 286
S.W.2d 359, 362-63 (1954) (fistfight in church); Two in Synanon Get Year in Snake Attack on Law-
yer, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1980, at 8, col. 6; Texas Preacher Who Shot 3 is Released on $15,000
Bail, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1980, at A14, col. 6.
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ology that seeks accuracy. Strong reasons justify minimizing the degree
of intrusion-the Constitution's expressed interest in religious freedom
and church autonomy, the limits of judicial competency, the risk of
inadvertent interference, and the availability of internal church mecha-
nisms for dispute resolution. 6 Another reason may be a belief that
such a mechanism will operate in good faith either because of integrity
or because of fear of bad publicity, which is so damaging to a voluntary
religious association. A methodology, therefore, should permit no
more intrusion than is absolutely necessary to permit it to function.
Watson deference and neutral principles are responses to the need
for methods of limited review that respect religious freedom and the
rule of law. This need apparently justifies accepting methods that ei-
ther intrude or risk intruding into religious affairs. The desirability of
limiting intrusions to the greatest extent possible results in a ban on
possible components of the approved methods-for example, a juris-
dictional inquiry, a review of arbitrariness by church decisionmakers,
or an examination of document provisions infused with doctrinal
meaning. Because courts have used these methods for some time, they
apparently believe that absence of the banned components still allows
the methods to function without serious impairment of their perceived
legitimacy.
The ultimate justification, then, for accepting Watson and neutral
principles is pragmatic. Courts need a way to resolve church property
disputes, preferably a way that minimizes judicial intrusion into church
affairs. The ultimate justification for permitting some intrusions to re-
main incorporated in the methods and for rejecting others is also prag-
matic. The true test is not the degree of harm they threaten, but their
indispensability in making a method functional.
The Gonzalez exceptions for fraud and collusion are illustrative.277
To reject them is to hold that the Watson method can avoid inquiry
into bad faith and still function without serious impairment of legiti-
macy. Several reasons might support this conclusion--the fear of mis-
interpreting or overriding ecclesiastical conduct, the fear that lack of
good faith would not necessarily invalidate church action under church
rules, and the probable infrequency of cases in which bad faith is an
issue. On the other hand, advocates might argue that the Gonzalez ex-
276. See Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 990-94 (discussing these concerns in broad
terms as they apply to voluntary associations).
277. See text accompanying notes 187-205 supra.
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ceptions are indispensable to Watson's functioning. According to this
argument, society insists on good faith in religious associations and
sharply questions a judicial method that overlooks bad faith. Resolu-
tion of the matter depends on judicial evaluation of these considera-
tions. Thus, the analysis turns not on whether the Gonzalez exceptions
would unconstitutionally intrude on religious rights, but on whether
the exceptions permit intrusions that are indispensable to the function-
ing of the Watson method.27
Because the true analysis is pragmatic, the formal Supreme Court
analysis has a false ring. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court
cases have justified the approved methods by asserting that they fulfill
the expectations of churches and their members. The assertion, how-
ever, is questionable. From the perspective of the foregoing analysis,
the degree to which assumptions about expectations are valid is also
important. In assessing complete deference and neutral principles, an
important consideration is their perceived legitimacy. The methods
can be assumed to have severely impaired legitimacy if they fail even
roughly to fulfill the fair expectations of the parties. The expectations
that the methodologies assume and purport to satisfy receive attention
next.
B. Meeting the Parties' Expectations
In Serbian Justice Brennan asserted that "it is the essence of religious
faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as
matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective cri-
teria."2 79 Although the statement arises in a discussion of hierarchical
churches, it could also reach to congregational churches. In both cases,
however, the assumption is too sweeping, even if it is assumed that
278. The notion of indispensable intrusions is related to the requirement that government use
the least restrictive means to a compelling end when its conduct interferes with free exercise. See,
e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 846-59.
The requirement is a corollary to requiring a compelling interest to justify state action. See, e.g.,
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1978) (plurality opinion); id at 634 n.8 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-29 (1972).
Although courts have used these analyses in free exercise cases, the concerns also bear on estab-
lishment clause matters. As Professor Tribe notes, "government actions have been deemed either
violative of the anti-establishment principle or not--the balancing process in that setting has been
incorporated into the definitions of the terms themselves." L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14- 10, at 846-
47 n.1.
279. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
714-15 (1976) (citation omitted).
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members are fully informed about their church's doctrine and polity.
An assumption of absolute submission holds true only if the member
submits to the decisionmaker-tribunal or congregational majority-
on all matters and accepts the decisionmaker's right to define its own
jurisdiction, to flout procedures and substantive rules, and to attend to
the church's guiding principles and spirit only as it sees fit. If the sub-
mission is less than complete or if the church authority's discretion has
bounds, a Watson court could easily fail to enforce the member's ex-
pectations. Complete deference places no checks on abuse of discre-
tion, except perhaps in the case of bad faith, a difficult matter to prove.
As for any ambiguity surrounding the membership's precise expecta-
tions, the church decisionmaker gains an automatic victory.
Neutral principles offers no guarantee that legal documents and se-
lected provisions in church documents furnish a complete picture of the
informed member's expectations, much less the church's. As the Jones
dissent emphasized, neutral principles operates as a restrictive rule of
evidence.280
The problem of discerning expectations grows in difficulty with the
recognition that church members are not fully informed about the sub-
stance of their relationship with their church. Even members who
make a sincere effort to stay apprised of church doctrine and polity
may view the official ownership of property and its disposition in case
of schism as peripheral matters that do not merit close attention. In
asserting the expectations of the typical church member, then, a court
may be inventing expectations by relying too heavily on formal docu-
ments, church practices, or surmise. 81
A reading of church documents and close attention to church prac-
tices might serve as a basis for identifying expectations. Such an in-
quiry, however, might disclose what a reasonable secular person might
280. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 611-13 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
281. Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 3, at
1161-62, discusses excessive reliance by some Watson courts on formal documents and practices in
ascertaining church polity. The same concern applies to courts that use neutral principles. For
example, in Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 345, 254 S.E.2d 330, 332 (1979), the Georgia
Supreme Court determined that the Holiness Baptist Association is hierarchical on the basis of an
examination of the minutes of its annual meetings. A dissenting judge, however, pointed out that
the determination "flagrantly collides with the traditional well known reality that a Baptist
Church prides itself in being a 'congregational church.'" 243 Ga. at 347, 254 S.E.2d at 334 (Jor-
dan, J., dissenting). Without an independent examination, we cannot determine which view is
correct. Yet, if the dissent is correct, the case illustrates how formal statements can override the
expectations of church members.
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expect; it would not necessarily determine the expectations of a church
member with a religious understanding formed by personal religious
experience.282 In Presbyterian Church, for example, the local congrega-
tion claimed that the denomination had abandoned the true faith.
283
For the church member, the disposition of property might well turn on
whether or not the local majority's determination was correct; that de-
termination, in turn, would depend on the member's understanding of
the Presbyterian Church's doctrine and perspective on church involve-
ment in secular life. The church member's expectations would not
necessarily comport with the determination of the denominational judi-
catory. The church member's expectations, moreover, might easily be
that the Presbyterian tradition, which is less hierarchical than other
churches,284 does not give complete authority to the highest church ju-
dicatory in these cases. A court, however, might study formal church
doctrine and documents and reach a different conclusion, in part be-
cause it lacks a "feel" for the church.285 To make matters even more
difficult, church members may honestly have different expectations,
and a civil court of limited competency could not make an accurate
assessment of the competing viewpoints.
At issue, then, is not simply a court's technical competence to under-
stand religious concepts, but the ability of a secular tribunal to discern
the legitimate expectations of a believer. A counterargument, however,
might assert that the apprehension over judicial competence is over-
blown. A court may have ecclesiastical precedent to guide it and might
even consider appointing a master. The arguments that challenge judi-
cial competence in the church setting seem to apply in other areas; for
example, discerning the expectations of members of secular associa-
tions such as fraternal organizations with an elaborate lore.286 The crit-
icism of court involvement, however, is more telling as it applies to
religious organizations because, there, a constitutional prohibition bans
282. Cf. Master v. Second Parish of Portland, 124 F.2d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1941), critiqued in
Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over Church Property, supra note 3, at 1163 n.109 (stating
that a church agreement should be read not "through the eyeglasses of experts," but "from the
viewpoint of the local folks .... ").
283. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 442 & n.l (1969).
284. See note 31 supra.
285. See note 281 supra.
286. See C. ZOLLMAN, supra note 3, at 210.
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a full-scale inquiry. Because the stakes are higher, the tolerance for
judicial error should be less.
A court cannot fashion rules that will accurately and constitutionally
enforce the expectations of believers. The Watson test, the neutral
principles test, and even the departure-from-doctrine test presume to
resolve disputes in accord with member expectations. Their respective
criteria, however, prove inadequate for the task because they intrude
into constitutionally protected areas and rely on untenable assumptions
about membership expectations.
At the heart of the problem is insufficient evidence. Concerns about
judicial competence and religious freedom forbid courts from consider-
ing highly relevant evidence. Watson and neutral principles unsuccess-
fully seek to avoid the difficulty by looking to nonreligious language
and concepts and by using assumptions about expectations to justify
the restrictive inquiry. The Watson method assumes the member's to-
tal obedience to church authority in all church related affairs, an as-
sumption that may or may not be valid for a given church. The
insistence on taking ecclesiastical decisions as the court finds them
could be viewed as a best guess approximation of expectations. No
reason, however, justifies assuming that the methodology will produce
an acceptable approximation. Neutral principles assumes that secular
provisions about ownership reflect expectations or a close approxima-
tion. Again, the assumption lacks persuasive support.
Particularly disconcerting is the Supreme Court's acceptance of both
neutral principles and compulsory deference as alternative tests. The
acceptance suggests that one method is not significantly better than the
other. If applied to a garden variety case like Jones, the methods can
yield diametrically opposite results. The highest church authority, for
example, might decree that the property belongs to the denomination,
and the neutral principles analysis of the deed and of provisions in
other documents might award the property to the local church. Thus,
not only is neither method better than the other, but neither method is
particularly successful in ascertaining expectations.
This discussion has assumed the existence of a set of expectations
that a court equipped with an ideal methodology could identify as the
legitimate expectations of all parties. A church, however, may have
been so remiss in structuring internal mechanisms for dispute resolu-
tion and in identifying property rights that a court could not ascertain
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legitimate expectations because no defensible basis for any exists. 87
Neither Watson nor neutral principles grapples with the problem be-
cause each identifies a basis for expectations, whether or not it in fact
exists.288
Formulations of church property ownership and church authority
over property decisions are generally constructed so that resort to judi-
cially impenetrable religious language and practice is essential. The
solution lies in requiring churches to formulate answers to property
questions in language that requires no reference to religious language
and custom. Churches must translate their expectations into language
that a civil court can readily and constitutionally comprehend. 289 This
solution receives attention in the next section.
III. THE SECULAR DOCUMENTS METHOD: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the search for a solution, the neutral principles approach points in
the right direction. The Jones Court validated roughly the right ap-
proach, but for the wrong reason. The primary advantage of neutral
principles lies in its reliance on legal documents and on language in
internal church documents that sounds like it belongs in such legal doc-
uments as deeds and articles of incorporation. Neutral principles is
wrong in its assumptions that these provisions reflect church expecta-
tions.
Suppose that a legislature or court insisted that religious organiza-
tions translate their property arrangements into a secular tongue. If a
church and its members understood that a court would enforce only
secular provisions, they would have a powerful incentive to reach a
clear agreement about property allocation and to ensure that the legal
arrangements reflect their expectations. Neutral principles implicitly
conveys this message, but only implicitly.
29 °
287. See Kauper, supra note 3, at 371-72 & n.76.
288. The departure-from-doctrine test also claimed that it was based on protecting the expec-
tations of the church founders. See notes 56-57 supra See also Schnorr's Appeal, 67 Pa. 138, 147
(1870) ("The guarantee of religious freedom ... does not guarantee freedom to steal
churches.... [I]t does not confer upon [church members] the right of taking away the property
consecrated to other uses by those who may now be sleeping in their graves.").
289. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
290. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (churches can foreordain the outcome of a
neutral principles adjudication by revising provisions in deeds, corporate charters, and church
constitutions). See also Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
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I propose going one step further and permitting judicial enforcement
to back up only those secular provisions appearing in deeds, corpora-
tion papers, and other legal documents. This approach is the secular
documents method. Unlike neutral principles, it directly requires
churches and their members to explain their property arrangements in
language that a court can construe without constitutional hazard;
otherwise the parties face the alternative of a court-devised solution
based on presumptions that do not purport to rely on the parties' expec-
tations. Also, unlike neutral principles, the secular documents method
would avoid the problem inherent in pulling secular provisions out of
the religious documents with the risk of reading them out of context
and missing their religious import. Because the secular documents
method does not rely on internal church documents, it does not require
determining whether or not a church is hierarchical as a prelude to
examining denominational documents. The proposed method still per-
mits churches to arrange their affairs as they wish; however, it forbids
their use of religious language as a shield.
Could a secular document incorporate by reference a church docu-
ment? An affirmative answer risks defeating in part the purpose of the
proposed secular documents method. A qualified affirmative answer,
however, is possible. Suppose a deed places title in the hands of a
board of trustees but subjects their control to a specified provision in
the church's by-laws. If the specified provision is in secular language, a
court can permit the incorporation. If the deed restriction subjects
trustee control to the church by-laws in general, a court would be well
advised to refuse to construe the church document. The risks of intru-
sion and misinterpretation loom too large and defeat the purpose of the
secular documents rule.29 1 References beyond the secular document
simply for the purpose of convenience are acceptable-for example, to
reduce the frequency of necessary revisions to the secular documents.
Thus, in the above illustration, reference to a specified provision in the
church's by-laws avoids the need to revise the deed every time the pro-
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (in rejecting departure-from-doctrine and applying the first
amendment, the Court noted that relationships involving church property must be structured so
that civil courts need not resolve ecclesiastical questions).
291. This approach is in line with the standard neutral principles method, which looks only to
those provisions in church documents that expressly deal with control of property. See, e.g., Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 600-01 (1979) (discussing Canes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976)).
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vision undergoes amendment. Incorporations for other purposes are
unacceptable.
Although the secular documents method would eliminate much of
the ambiguity attending religious disputes, the possibility of ambiguity
would remain as it frequently does in any secular setting. Suppose a
church fails to comply with the insistence on secular language in secu-
lar documents or it attempts to comply, but creates ambiguity through
poor drafting. A court should begin its analysis by noting that the obli-
gation to explain property arrangements in secular language falls on
the church. If notions of religious doctrine so infect a provision that
the court could not consider it, the court should ignore the provision
and rely on remaining provisions. Alternatively, it might decide that
without the provision, remaining provisions either make little sense or
obviously fail to describe even roughly the intent of the drafters. To
resolve the problem of the unclear document, the court could rely on
presumptions.
Suppose, for example, that in Jones a provision in the articles of in-
corporation of the local church stated that any property disputes would
be decided by the denominational presbytery, provided that the presby-
tery continued its fidelity to the traditional doctrines of the church.
The court should ignore this provision because a doctrinal question is
central to its meaning. The court might then rely on other provisions in
secular documents. Another provision might declare that all matters
not treated by other sections of the articles of incorporation fall within
the jurisdiction of the local elders or session. The court might decide
that to permit the session to decide the dispute would not comport even
roughly with the drafters' intent. If the court so decided, it might then
determine the decisionmaker by relying on a presumption, such as ma-
jority rule by the local congregation.292
The actual decision in Jones offers another illustration. The Georgia
Supreme Court293 recognized a presumption favoring majority rule
when the evidence fails to disclose which faction of the local congrega-
tion possesses church property.294 Although both the neutral principles
and secular documents methods might employ this presumption in sim-
292. See notes 267-73 supra and notes 295-96 infira and accompanying text.
293. Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 388-89, 260 S.E.2d 84, 84-85 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1080 (1980). See notes 267-73 supra and accompanying text.
294. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606-09 (1979).
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ilar circumstances, each would justify the presumption on a different
basis.
In Jones the court permitted a presumption as an estimate of the
expectations of the parties. A rational basis, however, is lacking for a
presumption of majority rule in the local congregation of a tradition-
ally hierarchical church.29 Under the proposed secular documents
methods, such a presumption would serve as a final stop gap measure.
It would seek not to resolve ambiguities according to the presumed ex-
pectations of the parties, but to permit efficient resolution of a problem
that the court must resolve in some manner. Any other rationale for
the presumption would permit the court to make a judgment about reli-
gious doctrines and polities based on only a secular understanding.
Gaining that understanding would likely involve judgments and exam-
inations that tread on the first amendment's spirit, if not its letter.
A pragmatic basis for the presumption avoids unconstitutional con-
duct. The result, however, is the same and may be at variance with the
authentic religious prescription. The concern raised is at least modified
by the rationale. Once the method receives the state's approval, more-
over, the drafters of the church's documents would understand the
pragmatic analysis to which the court would resort in the face of ambi-
guity. They therefore would understand the risk associated with poor
drafting or failure to revise existing documents. This approach still
may prove harsh on good faith error; occasional but avoidable injus-
tices, however, must be weighed against the benefits deriving from the
proposed method. The method motivates churches to clarify and artic-
ulate expectations and, in case of dispute, offers a means of resolution
that avoids first amendment intrusion. Moreover, it is honest about its
pragmatic rationale for accepting presumptions and does not attempt to
assert a rational basis when none exists.296
295. See notes 267-73 supra and accompanying text.
296. See notes 267-73 supra and accompanying text. The argument against the presumption
permitted in Jones is that the Supreme Court apparently relied on a rational connection between a
presumption of majority rule and the fact that congregational churches usually rely on majority
rule, We argued that this rational connection is nonexistent or at least too attenuated to employ
when operating in the first amendment area. The proposed secular documents method, however,
does not purport to rely on a rational basis. Instead, the state employs a presumption to resolve an
impasse. To be sure, if a rational connection is essential to satisfy the constitution, then this justifi-
cation for a presumption fails. Yet, if any justification other than rational connection is permissi-
ble, the breaking of an impasse would seem to be a persuasive one.
In the context under discussion, two considerations support this argument. First, although ma-
jority rule is not the only method that local churches use to resolve disputes, it is an accepted
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The fact pattern in Carnes v. Smith,297 a pre-Jones Georgia case, of-
fers another illustration. The deed to the property of the Noah's Ark
Methodist Church was in the name of specified individuals as "trustees
of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Mount Pleasant Academy...
their Successors in office as such forever in fee simple."2 9 Since 1852,
the local church had been affiliated with the Methodist Episcopal
Church and its successor, the United Methodist Church. In 1969 the
local church withdrew from the denomination and claimed ownership
of the property. In the resulting dispute the Georgia Supreme Court
applied for the first time the neutral principles test that it later applied
in Jones. Because the United Methodist Church is hierarchical, the
court held that the local church was subject to denominational law.
The court also noted that under Georgia statutes, church property must
be held "according to the mode of church government or rules of disci-
pline" and that trustees "shall be subject to the authority of the church
or religious society. '299  The court therefore looked to the United
Methodist Church book of discipline. According to the court, provi-
sions written in secular language established an implied trust over the
property in favor of the denomination. 3°  Three dissenters would have
method. The same might be said for rule by local eldership. As long as a court or legislature
creates a presumption involving these or similar methods, it is not acting irrationally. Rather, it is
establishing a sensible, although not perfect way to solve a knotty problem. Second, the court
employs such a presumption only because the local church failed in its responsibilities to state its
methodology in secular terms. Thus the church is not an entirely innocent victim.
297. 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
298. Id at 30, 222 S.E.2d at 324.
299. Id at 38, 222 S.E.2d at 327-28 (quoting respectively GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-5507, -5508
(1977)).
300. Id at 38-39, 222 S.E.2d at 328. The phrase "implied trust" was not used in the same
artificial way that it was used and rejected in Watson. The United Methodist book of discipline
required that every instrument conveying property to a local church contain a specified express
trust clause favoring the denomination. The book of discipline further provided that in the ab-
sence of such a clause an implied trust results in favor of the denomination if any of three "indica-
tions" are present. The indications are:
(a) the conveyance of the property to the trustees of a local church or agency or any
predecessor to the United Methodist Church; (b) the use of the name, customs, and pol-
ity of any predecessor to the United Methodist Church in such a way as to be thus
known to the community as a part of such denomination; (c) the acceptance of the pas-
torate of ministers appointed by the superintendent of the District or Annual Conference
of any predecessor to the United Methodist Church.
In Carnes the Georgia court found all three indications present. In Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
600 n.2 (1979), the Supreme Court partly quoted and partly paraphrased these provisions, appar-
ently because it saw them as an illustration of the sort of provisions that a court could apply
without violating the first amendment.
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applied the formal title version of neutral principles and would have
found the local church to be the trust's sole beneficiary. 0'
Depending on its interpretation of the deed and its use of presump-
tions, a secular documents court might have decided for either the local
church or the denomination. A court might find the deed's language to
be ambiguous. Although doubtless the language was initially intended
to refer to the Noah's Ark church, it could seek to transfer control to
any local church that succeeded it as the official denominational
church. In case of the demise of all affiliated churches at Mount Pleas-
ant Academy, the United Methodist Church could arguably use the
property as it wished-perhaps to establish a new local church. A per-
plexed secular documents court could settle the matter by indulging in
a presumption favoring either the denomination or the local church.
Again, the presumption would have a pragmatic basis; that is, the court
could not persuasively establish a rational basis for a presumption
favoring either party. To resolve the dispute and insure judicial consis-
tency, a secular documents court would either apply the presumption
that prior courts with similar cases have applied or, if no presumption
has previously arisen in the jurisdiction, establish a presumption for
present and future use. The parties would have to endure the presump-
tion, because they had failed to make clear their intentions.30 2
The secular documents method would also avoid the necessity of ju-
dicial perusal and construction of internal church documents, although
here the disciplinary provisions seem capable of secular interpretation.
The Georgia statutes would not necessarily rule out the proposed meth-
odology. Although church law should govern the holding of church
property and the conduct of trustees, a court could declare that the only
permissible method of determining church law is reading its secular
translation in secular documents. Other evidence of church law, such
as the meaning of a book of discipline, is beyond judicial competence.
This approach also saves a court from having to determine whether or
not the local church's relationship to the general church subjects it to
the latter's laws. The secular documents must make clear the relation-
ship and its consequences.
Any concern about employing presumptions extends to the entire
proposed approach. A rule restricting evidence is open to the criticism
301. 236 Ga. at 43, 222 S.E.2d at 330 (Undercofter, J., dissenting).
302. See notes 292-96 supra and accompanying text.
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that it limits the court's ability to ascertain the expectations of the par-
ties.3"3 In church property disputes, however, much of the crucial evi-
dence is constitutionally off limits, and the accessible evidence offers
little hope of painting a complete picture. Extending the constitutional
boundary to increase the amount of permissible evidence still leaves
important evidence beyond the boundary; moreover, the probability of
accuracy is not necessarily improved. In addition, the evidence that is
currently permissible may be constitutionally questionable.
An exception to the rule's restricted inquiry might be extrinsic evi-
dence of fraud or mutual mistake. At issue is not the bad faith of the
official interpreter of church doctrine, but bad faith in drafting legal
documents and in complying with their restrictions on transfer. Sup-
pose, for example, that trustees hold title to property for the local con-
gregation and, without the congregation's authority, transfer title to the
denomination. The trustees might argue: "Our interpretation of
church doctrine authorizes us to make the transfer and even requires us
to do so." To lodge a successful challenge, the congregation could not
raise a competing interpretation of denominational authority. Instead,
it would seek to prove that the trustees acted out of bad faith, as op-
posed to religious conviction. The trustees might also argue: "We have
the right to transfer this property as we see fit, because the legal docu-
ments place no restrictions on our discretion." The congregation could
counter by pointing to the nature of the trustee's relationship and argu-
ing that they are implicitly required to act in good faith. Fraud and
collusion often are not easy matters to prove because a thin rationaliza-
tion by errant trustees may suffice to create sufficient doubt about the
charge. Under the suggested rule, then, the local congregation would
be aware of the trustees' power and would assume some risk in making
the appointment and presuming good character.
The secular documents method gives churches maximum opportu-
nity to eliminate ambiguity about the control and disposition of prop-
erty. Because the method insists on a statement of expectations in
terminology familiar to a civil court, it gives the church and its member
303. The restrictive approach to evidence proposed here superficially goes against the grain of
modem learning. See, eg., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-3, at 110 (2d ed.
1977) ("The whole thrust of our law for over a century has been directed to the eradication of
exclusionary rules of evidence in civil cases."); E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND
FEDERAL EVIDENCE xi (5th ed. J. Weinstein 1976) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally
biased in favor of admissibility).
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two choices--comply and greatly reduce the risk of judicial misinter-
pretation of expectations or risk a resolution that claims not to realize
expectations but to settle the dispute. The secular documents method
nevertheless fails to insure fully against disappointed expectations of
those who comply. Disputes may still turn on controversies that the
judiciary may not touch. For example, church members may argue
that uncanonical methods resulted in the election of new trustees. The
court could not assess the methodology or the significance of the al-
leged deviations to determine the election's validity. It must simply
look to the legal documents and judge the ensuing property disputes
according to the method previously discussed.
Not all church members, of course, may have actual knowledge of
the contents of the legal documents.3" Members, however, may just as
easily lack actual knowledge of the secular provisions of church docu-
ments or of the internal church mechanisms for resolving disputes. No-
tice is an unsolvable problem. The proposed method offers some
improvement by requiring church members to place the rules of prop-
erty ownership in secular language and on the public record; it thus
affords constructive notice. The secular language requirement recog-
nizes that few church members are canon lawyers. Not all church
members are civil lawyers either. The secular language requirement,
however, removes one barrier to understanding and improves the op-
portunity for full notice.
A related problem is that some churches may be unaware that the
legislature or the courts have altered the method of resolving church
property disputes. The lack of actual knowledge can easily jeopardize
a church's internal arrangements. This problem, too, is not wholly
solvable. Once the first court decision or first statute adopting the secu-
lar documents method appears, the churches have at least constructive
notice. They are in no different a situation than a secular voluntary
association or business association that must keep abreast of legal de-
velopments. Moreover, the risk of changing law already exists. A court
today, for example, might abandon complete deference in favor of neu-
tral principles or discard the formal title method in favor of a broader
version of neutral principles. Courts that have made such changes
seem simply to change their rule with rarely any consideration of
304. See note 281 .upra and accompanying text.
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whether the new rule should be prospective only.305 Whether or not
the secular documents rule becomes a possibility, then, churches must
bear the responsibility of keeping their legal information up-to-date.
The possibility of changing legal methods, moreover, motivates a
church to reevaluate the articulation of its property arrangements or
the arrangements themselves. A decision to change either the arrange-
ments or its articulation increases the chances that the membership will
gain actual knowledge of their property interests and their potential
disposition.
The advantages of the secular documents method are obvious. It
promises a reduction in ambiguity and in the risk of unconstitutional
intrusion. As a variant of neutral principles, it shares the same basic
flaws. The method relies on a very formalistic approach that examines
limited evidence, and the lack of equitable discretion offers a pitfall for
the ill-informed and unwary. The secular documents approach may
reduce the risk of ambiguity because of its nonreliance on religious
documents, but it may possibly increase the risk of arbitrariness be-
cause of its reliance on very limited evidence. The risks, however, stem
from the church's failure to clarify the desired property arrangement.
The ability to minimize adverse risk points to the striking advantage of
the secular documents method: It declines to rely on unwarranted
membership expectations. Instead, it requires the church to disclose
the intent and shows the church exactly how to do so. As with neutral
principles, the method is flexible enough to permit the church to devise
any arrangement for property control.
The cost of implementation is also a consideration. To insure accu-
rate statements of property control, many churches would have to re-
vise their deeds, articles of incorporation, and other documents. In
addition to the matter of accompanying legal fees is the matter of stir-
ring internal dissension by airing the issue of property control. 306
305. In Jones v. Wolf the Supreme Court stated that the case presented no claim that retroac-
tive application of a neutral principles approach infringed on first amendment rights. 443 U.S. at
606 n.4. The Court noted that the Georgia Supreme Court had stated its intent to employ neutral
principles in both Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167
S.E.2d 658 (1969), and Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976). In the former case, however, the court employed the formal title method without advance
warning. In Carnes the Georgia court adopted a broader neutral principles approach also without
advance warning. Thus, although the Jones Court was correct with respect to the particular case
before it, the earlier Georgia case applied respective new rules without prior notice.
306. See text accompanying note 264 supra.
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These objections, however, have limited validity. The current neutral
principles doctrine threatens churches that fail to reflect reality in their
secular documents and in the secular provisions in church documents.
The risk of a state court deciding to switch to neutral principles poses a
danger even to churches in states in which the Watson method cur-
rently reigns. 30 7 A prudent church, then, would incur similar adminis-
trative costs under the current system. As for stirring up dissension, it
is the price of clarifying the rights of parties and giving notice to those
who have rights and to those who do not.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current methods for resolving church property disputes assume
that a judicial rule can harmonize constitutional mandates on public
policy with traditional rules for settling private disputes. As this Article
has argued, however, the harmony attained relies on contrivance in rec-
onciling the need to avoid judicial intrusion with the need to satisfy the
expectations of churches and their members. Candor requires admit-
ting the pragmatic basis for approving the accepted methods. Courts
should admit that Watson and neutral principles exist to preserve the
social order and yet to permit no more judicial intrusion than is neces-
sary to function and to still enjoy perceived legitimacy. Such candor,
however, also requires admitting that, upon examination, the methods
lose their perceived legitimacy. They are not particularly successful in
avoiding intrusion into church affairs or in identifying the parties' ex-
pectations.
The proposed secular documents method is candid. It tells the
307. Courts may change methodology more than once. For example, the Georgia Supreme
Court abandoned the departure-from-doctrine test in favor of formal legal title in Presbyterian
Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969). It then
adopted a broader neutral principles test in Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
An Indiana appellate court declined to use the Watson method in favor of formal title in Price
v. Merryman, 147 Ind. App. 295, 259 N.E.2d 883 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971). The
Indiana state supreme court then appeared to adopt a broader neutral principles method in Smart
v. Yearly Conference of the Wesleyan Methodist Church of Am., 257 Ind. 17, 271 N.E.2d 713
(1971). See United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent Methodist Church, 150
Ind. App. 574, 276 N.E.2d 916 (1971).
The Ohio Supreme Court adopted a formal title approach in Serbian Orthodox Church Con-
gregation of St. Demetrium v. Keleman, 21 Ohio St. 2d 154, 256 N.E.2d 212, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
827 (1970). It seemed to abandon this method in favor of a Watson approach in State ex rel.
Morrow v. Hill, 51 Ohio St. 2d 74, 364 N.E.2d 1156 (1977).
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churches exactly how the civil judiciary will decide cases so that
churches can generally predict the outcome of any dispute. It not only
permits churches to define their expectations with a free hand, but also
puts churches on notice that they must assume the responsibility or risk
the consequences. In addition, the simplified nature of the method and
its reliance on limited evidence ease the judicial task.
The secular documents method still carries some potential for unfair-
ness because it leaves little room for equity and could harm small
churches that fail to keep abreast of the law. It also incurs costs for
churches that must revise legal documents to reflect expectations. A
partial response is that neutral principles, an accepted method, suffers
the same deficiencies as well as still others. The Watson method is no
better, primarily because it conforms churches to a preconceived orga-
nizational framework. Comparisons aside, the secular documents
method at least gives a church a fighting chance to control its own af-
fairs. Given the problems inherent in establishing a modus vivendi be-
tween satisfying constitutional demands and doing private justice, no
more can be expected.
Despite the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has enunciated few
firm holdings. As a general principle, the Court has held that courts
cannot resolve church property disputes on the basis of religious doc-
trine and practice.3 °8 It has also held that, in a hierarchical church, a
civil court must defer to the highest church court's resolution concern-
ing issues of doctrine and polity.3° The Watson method thus has re-
ceived formal approval only in disputes concerning hierarchical
churches.31 0 As for neutral principles, the Court has approved the
method "at least in general outline." '' Jones, which concerned a tra-
ditionally hierarchical church, approved reliance on statutes and on
language in secular and religious documents entailing no inquiry into
religious doctrine.31 2 Jones states that the Court also approved the
308. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
309. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
724-25 (1976).
310. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572, _ 417 A.2d 19,24 (1980) (hold-
ing that New Jersey follows Watson, but still stating "[o]nly where no hierarchical control is in-
volved, should the neutral principles of law principle be called into play.").
311. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
312. id at 602-03.
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method in Maryland & Virginia Eldershov, a per curiam decision.31 3 In
a confusing opinion, the Maryland high court identified the church as
congregational with regard to property and hierarchical with regard to
polity;314 the distinction seems contrary to the ban on determinations
about ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Caution would argue in favor of rec-
ognizing express Supreme Court approval of neutral principles only as
it applies to hierarchical churches. Whether these distinctions comprise
a plausible pattern is open to broad speculation. In any case, the
Supreme Court has retained considerable leeway for imposing limita-
tions on current rules and for developing new rules. It may use its dis-
cretion to formulate a new, more justifiable rule or to continue to
wrestle with methods that have already proven inadequate.
313. Id
314. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
249 Md. 650, 241 A.2d 691, 699 (1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528, aft'd, 254 Md. 162,
254 A.2d 162 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970). The second Maryland Court of Ap-
peals decision did not address the prior decision's statement on the divided jurisdiction of the local
and general churches. Nor did the Supreme Court's decision address the statement.
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